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Security Books Media Encryption United States Book Reviews

Beyond Fear 152

Posted by timothy from the more-secrets-fewer-lies dept.
pres (Preston Tollinger) writes "I picked up Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security In an Uncertain World basically because it was by Bruce Schneier. I am sure most Slashdot readers know Schneier's name and his work. The problem is, this book probably isn't for you (but might be perfect for someone you know)." To find out what he means by that, read on for the rest of Tollinger's review, below.
Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security In an Uncertain World
author Bruce Schneier
pages 256
publisher Copernicus Books
rating 7
reviewer Preston Tollinger
ISBN 0387026207
summary A worthwhile introduction to real-world (not just computer) security, aimed at a literate but non-technical audience.

The Book

Beyond Fear is described very well by its subtitle: this book helps you think sensibly about security. Don't expect the highly technical material you have seen in Schneier's previous books, but rather the more accessible material, much like you might read in his monthly newsletter. That doesn't mean the book is breezy: In Schneier's wordy but well-written manner, he describes a five-step process to analyze any particular security system or practice. The process helps you make sure you understand what you are protecting, what the tradeoffs are, and whether, in the end if it is worthwhile to implement the system.

He then goes on to apply this method to a series of security issues while covering the various types of security and their weaknesses. For the most part this not a technical evaluation of the tools used, but rather an analysis for each example of what the security goals are and how the tools and technology achieve or fail to achieve those goals. Even more importantly, he deals with the tradeoffs inherent in any security system.

Schneier applies this method not only to the global issues that have come up since 9/11, from airline security to protecting government secrets, but also to personal issues, including tradeoffs in personal home security. By doing so, he takes principles which might be hard for some to understand in the abstract and makes it clear how they apply in situations almost everyone has thought about.

By drawing parallels, for instance, between how you might select a home alarm system to how you might evaluate the use of face recognition at the airport, Schneier shows that you don't have to be a security "expert" to think logically about security. He brings to the forefront the tradeoffs that you made in these personal choices; for example, the downside of dealing with deactivating an alarm system every time you come home. Then, in turn, he shows how you must consider the problem of people being falsely identified by the face recognition system at the airport.

Given this strong framework, he then uses his method to analytically and dispassionately tear apart most of the silly and stupid security methods (note my dispassion here) that have been put in place or considered in the past few years, from airline security methods to national ID cards. With a combination of funny yet pointed anecdotes, clear statistics and the occasional Harry Potter reference, Schneier uses his talent for cogent, rational explanation to show how people can think about security in the modern world, instead of simply panicking at every ominous news report.

To Read Or Not To Read

So it sounds like a good book and probably would be for some, but there was not enough new content for me to make it worth my limited reading time. Perhaps due to my general interest in security or just because waiting in line at the airport has already given me a lot of time to think, but I have already considered most of the ideas Schneier raises in Beyond Fear. I own a shredder, but not an alarm system, because I have considered the risks and costs. I dislike the idea of a National ID card because I was already afraid of what someone might do who got access to it, and already monitor my credit report. I have written my local representative that while his recent bill to remove SSNs from insurance cards is nice, it's far too late (and how about just getting people to stop using SSN's as passwords?).

If this describes you, skip the book. However you might note above I didn't say this was a waste of my money. This book is soon going to find its way into hands of friends and relations who need to think about security. It is a great introduction to a way of thinking that is critical in a post-9/11 world. It should be required reading for members of Congress before any more security laws are passed based only on the need to do something instead of rational thought.

Summary

If you think consciously about security, know who Schneier is, or have ever noticed (and complained) that many airport security measures make no sense, you probably don't need this book. If you have only considered this topic in general, though, and want a book to focus your thoughts, Beyond Fear will do that. Finally, if you have friends who don't yet think this way (admit it, we all do), get this book into their hands.

You can purchase Beyond Fear from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
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  • Fellow slashdotters (Score:1, Funny)

    by Anonymous Coward
    Prepare to be dazzled! Well, as Timothy already mentioned, the name of the book that I read was Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security In an Uncertain World. [Reads from back cover] It's about these ... fears. Fears... with security issues ... and ... mehtods for dealing with them ... and statistics ... Did I mention this book was written by a guy named Bruce Schneier? And published by the good people at Copernicus Books. So, in conclusion, on the Slashdot scale of one to ten, ten being the highest

  • Best example of how to speak about Security (Score:5, Informative)

    by StaticEngine ( 135635 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:39PM (#7125691) Homepage
    As a computer person, I don't consider myself a great conversationalist. And I agree that I've already thought about a lot of the issues Schneier brings up in "Beyond Fear."

    However, most "normal people" relate well to anecdotes, and general examples, and this book is full of them. Instead of trying to describe how 256 bit keys are safer than 64 bit keys to non-technical friends and relatives, I've learned lots of metahphors involving door locks, car theft, and every day risk assesment that will help me to get my point across a lot more clearly.

    I think this is the point of this book. It's not technical. It's Security for the Everyman.

    • Re:Best example of how to speak about Security (Score:4, Insightful)

      by Skyshadow ( 508 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:50PM (#7125823) Homepage
      The trouble with that is the tendancy to run into serious "metaphor sheer" when using an example you're making up on the fly...

      Here's a book idea: Come up with metaphors for computer-related ideas which will stand up reasonably well even as the user/cluebie/PHB makes assumptions based on them. I'd buy two compies, one for work and one for home, and keep 'em right next to the phone. I can't tell you how often it'd be useful...

    • Indeed. When explaining concepts in computer security to non-techy types, the hardest part is how "security" is actually a trade-off. Car safety makes an excellent analogy.

      For example, almost everyone can understand that no car is completely immune from accidents, along with unavoidable injury if an accident is bad enough. Hence, lessen injury by wearing seat belts or driving a car with air bags. You may still have injuries in an accident, but the injury is far less damaging than without belts or bags.
      • > Likewise, no computer is hack proof. We all know why, so I wont bother explaing here. But to help explain this to non-techs, I draw this comparison: In order for there to be a car where occupants are injury-free after an accident, the car's gas efficiency would be interpreted not in miles-per-gallon, but rather gallons-per-mile. Why? Because of the sheer weight such a car would have to be.

        Better analogy:

        Once you've gotten your co-worker to agree to a statement like that, point out tha

        • You provide the perfect example of a flawed extension of an analogy. Main battle tanks are designed to protect the occupants against enemy fire, not ramming. If a vehicle with the same mass as an Abrams were designed to protect against collision with more massive objects, it would be safer even if everyone drove them.

          Security works like that. You take something that works in one environment (Abrams on the battlefield getting shot at) and put it in a different environment, one it wasn't designed for (on the
    • The discussions of door locks and car theft and bank vaults aren't metaphors. They're examples. He's showing concrete cases where one makes judgments about security.

      Remember: this is not a book about computer security. It's not trying to teach you about password management techniques (although he does use password lists as yet another example, since they're yet another everyday security issue for most of us) or firewall configuration. It's trying to teach you how to think about security in general.

      To
    • 64 bit keys will protect you against all but governments and large corporations. 128 bits should protect you against all mortal civilizations forever. 256 bits will do the same, but run a bit slower.

      In most cases, any of those bit lengths will be effective, so there's no reason trying to explain how one is safer to friends and relatives unless they're protecting really big secrets like the timetable for the next 9/11.
    • StaticEngine [slashdot.org] said:

      However, most "normal people" relate well to ... general examples, and this book is full of them.

      If it's like Applied Cryptography [schneier.com] there are tons. For a few weeks after reading AC [schneier.com] all I dreamt of Bob, Alice, Trent, Peggy and that kid Alice kidnapped.

  • Process vs Organized Security (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Schmucky The Cat ( 687075 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:43PM (#7125737) Homepage
    This piques me. I'd love a process that evaluates proposed security processes. Every place I have ever been, but especially workplaces, have had some sort of "Security" organization. In all cases the goal of that organization has just been to make up insane new practices or arbitrary restrictions that serve to enhance the power of the security organization.

    This came true on a national scale with 9/11 of course. The public went whole hog for the idea of airport screeners but those airport screeners have the brains of a mall security guard.

    I'd love to see a simple process for evaluating new proposed 'security' practices in my organization to help debunk the idea that these proposals provide any security at all.

    • Re:Process vs Organized Security (Score:5, Interesting)

      by Slarty ( 11126 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:14PM (#7126054) Homepage
      Airport security just doesn't work very well anyway, even now, after 9/11, when it's supposedly all beefed up.

      My freaky experience: I took a trip to Florida, and in my carryon luggage (a backpack) was a buck knife with a 4-inch serrated-edge blade. I wasn't trying to smuggle it through on purpose... the last time I had used the backpack was on a camping trip (where knives are handy) and I simply hadn't unpacked the front zipper pocket, where the knife was.

      Anyway, the knife made it cleanly through airport security. Twice. At two different "high-security" airports... and yes, it went through all the detectors and everything. I didn't even find the damned thing until I was on my last connecting flight. So yes, there are some major issues there.

      To tie this back in with your post... I hate to generalize based on one incident, but the extra security just ain't giving us a whole lot of extra security. Which leads me to believe that you're right... one of the main "benefits" of all this was just to allow the authorities to take actions "in the name of security" that only serve to give them more power.

      What that experience taught me is that I can't rely on those in authority to protect me, either me physically or my data or anything like that. Which means that citizens are going to have to start safeguarding themselves, and sometimes that may be in opposition to the "best interests" of the state. Which sure as heck don't seem to be our best interests much these days.

  • Paradox (Score:2, Redundant)

    by NoData ( 9132 )
    Hmm....so open-minded, rational people don't need to read this book, and irrational, knee-jerk reactionaries by definition won't read it, or won't be convinced. By the reviewer's logic this book is perfect....for noone.

    But seriously, I can't imagine convincing an Ashcroftian to sit down and consider the other side, but I might read it just for some common sense ammunition. You know, some security...against those...who..want..more..security... Uh, yeah.

    • That doesn't define the universe. In fact, the two extreme points that you cite are a very small portion of "all people".

      For the people that you are talking about, external agendas are the determining feature, and this book won't do anything for them. Neither will any other form of argument that doesn't address their real agendas. But for many people, this will be welcome. (Many is, again, much less than all people, or even all literate English speakers. But it's probably significantly larger than bot

  • What's wrong with national IDs? (Score:5, Insightful)

    by hanssprudel ( 323035 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:45PM (#7125753)
    I don't understand why Americans are so afraid of national ID cards. Where I live we have standardized national ID cards that are used in most situations, and I can't say how it has made me any less free.

    In the modern world, we are counted and registered with our government. What is wrong with having a standardized card to show who we are?

    I don't know if these cards would stop anybody from crashing airplanes, but they do help against things like identity theft, which is quite common in America but almost unheard of here. We don't have to have "three kinds of photo id" to go to bank, we don't consider our mother's maiden name or SS#'s security secrets, and we don't need to bring the electic bill to rent a movie.

    Granted, my country is much smaller than the US, but I would support having an EU wide Identity card standard. I cannot see sensible argument against it.

    • Re:What's wrong with national IDs? (Score:4, Insightful)

      by Otter ( 3800 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:02PM (#7125939) Journal
      I don't understand why Americans are so afraid of national ID cards. Where I live we have standardized national ID cards that are used in most situations, and I can't say how it has made me any less free.

      I think it's a combination of 1) people are used to what they're used to and when you accustomed to not having an Official State Identification Number there's unease about suddenly getting one and 2) many Americans, my own family included, fled here from countries where the government's concern with tracking you was less than entirely helpful.

      At the same time, there are obvious advantages to having a standard identity, which is why driver's licenses (state governments are trusted much more than the federal government) and social security numbers have taken on far more importance than they were ever intended to have. Essentially, the combination of the two already serves as an official identity.

      By the way, I have no idea of the relative rate of identity theft in the US and Europe, but it's certainly not "common" in any sense in which I'd use the word. If there's a significant difference, it's probably due to the fact that Europeans don't routinely have 15 different credit accounts.

      • Ever heard of a Social Security Number? Yeah, I too can find all sorts of documents that prove that companies and governmental organizations don't have a right to demand my SSN, but the recourse for that is that they simply deny you service / business. So you can live in a little shack in Montana and not give anybody your SSN, but in the real world, everybody requires it and will just tell you to sod off if you refuse. See, your rights haven't been abridged because no one is forcing you to leave your shack

    • Re:What's wrong with national IDs? (Score:5, Interesting)

      by Jeffrey Baker ( 6191 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:02PM (#7125940)
      It's really symptomatic of something else: American's don't trust their government. Over the last century the government and laws of the USA have really gotten out of control, but the population has mostly just let it slide. I mean it's illegal to smoke marijuana, but everyone does it anyway. It's illegal in many states to be involved in a blow job, or to arrange your furniture in a certain way, or to change the needle valves in your carburetor. All these laws are pretty stupid, but nobody really cares because they are unenforceable.

      In addition the people of the USA have a tradition of just being criminals. Practically anyone has a smuggler or a bootlegger or a bookie in their family tree somewhere. These things were illegal but not really dishonorable. And in the beginning days of the country, it was possible for someone to fuck up their lives in one area and simply start over further west. So we've gotten used to ignoring the laws and taking advantage of anonymity.

      The situation changes if the government suddenly becomes organized and informed. If the government has a good way to track who we are and what we are doing, all those things that are illegal will suddenly matter. So the reaction is to resist tracking and information programs. Of course, this is the incorrect reaction: what we should really be doing is reigning in our government and repealling stupid laws until we feel that we can trust it again. But that answer isn't as obvious.

      I'll end with a short example: last year I got on an SF MUNI streetcar at a station where the toll machines were broken. I paid my $1, but the machine didn't give me a ticket. No attendant was on duty so I just boarded the train anyway. Well, lo and behold here comes Fare Inspection Shitwit to check my ticket, which I didn't have, through no fault of my own. Inspector Shitwit gives me a ticket ($90 fine) for failure to have a ticket on the streetcar. Naturally I rebuked him profanely and threw the ticket in the trash. I don't have any intention of dealing with such rubbish. But now, six months later, there's a warrant for my arrest which will never be served by the SFPD and I will be unable to renew my driver's license, which is expired, until a year after the incident. If the government were *really* well organized I might even get arrested. I'm really afriad that in some well-organized, well-tracked future government regime, people will get in *real trouble* for not having a piece of paper that says you paid $1 to get on the bus.

      • Re:What's wrong with national IDs? (Score:1, Informative)

        by Anonymous Coward
        Well, lo and behold here comes Fare Inspection Shitwit to check my ticket, which I didn't have, through no fault of my own. Inspector Shitwit gives me a ticket ($90 fine) for failure to have a ticket on the streetcar. Naturally I rebuked him profanely and threw the ticket in the trash. I don't have any intention of dealing with such rubbish. But now, six months later, there's a warrant for my arrest which will never be served by the SFPD and I will be unable to renew my driver's license, which is expired, u
        • Actually you're wrong. The warrant expires after a year, and I'm almost there! Woohoo!

          • Re:What's wrong with national IDs? (Score:1, Informative)

            by Anonymous Coward
            Having personally just gotten through dealing with something very much like what you describe, I can tell you that YOU are wrong. The "warrant" may expire, but the conviction will not. Eventually you will be held accountable, and it will just get more expensive for you down the road.

            There is no statute of limitations on avoiding court-ordered penalties. You now have a court-ordered penalty by virtue of your neglect in clearing the matter (therefore the "charge" of freeloading your Muni ride stood).

            I al

      • How to get your driver's license back (Score:5, Funny)

        by Anonymous Coward on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:18PM (#7126103)
        Just renounce your US citizenship but remain in SF. That way you'll now be an illegal alien. Then just head on over to the DMV and they'll print your license out for you straight away.
      • You've just done a great job of supporting the anti-privacy argument - only criminals have anything to hide, so privacy is bad.

        Next time, pay the extra $1 (well, $1.25 now) to use another turnstile that actually gives you a transfer. Or, if you like taking the risk, at least go to court when you get a ticket. Failing to pay a ticket or show up for a court date just because you couldn't be bothered to pay $1 is pretty pathetic, and is far from a valid reason for not wanting a national ID card.
      • It's really symptomatic of something else: American's don't trust their government
        Too bad that when it comes to foreign policy that mistrust is swatted by the "America uber alles" knne-jerk reflex... Weapons of Mass Deception Anyone ?

    • Re:What's wrong with national IDs? (Score:4, Insightful)

      by abulafia ( 7826 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:03PM (#7125943)
      I don't know if these cards would stop anybody from crashing airplanes, but they do help against things like identity theft, which is quite common in America but almost unheard of here. We don't have to have "three kinds of photo id" to go to bank, we don't consider our mother's maiden name or SS#'s security secrets, and we don't need to bring the electic bill to rent a movie.

      Most of what you cite is convenience. It may be convenient to have one card for everything, but that doesn't mean making it mandatory is a good idea. Identity theft can be stopped in other ways, and it isn't even clear to me that a national ID card would do much to stop it here at all.

      The US started differently than European nations, and has a long history of distrust of the government. I still believe this is a valuble thing.

      The only party getting value out of national ID cards is the government. Why should I quietly give that to them? I have no reason to.

      • dentity theft can be stopped in other ways, and it isn't even clear to me that a national ID card would do much to stop it here at all.

        The problem with ID theft in North America is that the only way they tend to identify you is by using your SSN and drivers license.

        Both are easy to get by and in the end nobody is really asking.

        The CBC had an interview this week with someone who did ID theft for a couple of years as a living. It's almost chilling to hear how easy it is to loose your identity and get your
        • It's almost chilling to hear how easy it is to loose your identity and get your credit rating trashed just because someone got your home address and Birth Date.

          Yes, I'm well aware of that - I've had a mild form happen to me (someone got enough info to open two credit cards, and I caught it quickly - it wasn't as bad as it could have been).

          In Germany for example medical records are not allowed to be kept for more than 5 years (bit me in the ass a while ago when I tried to get some results from some yea

          • Which is exactly why I object so strongly to having a national ID. All it would do is make life easier for snoops, identity thieves, and meddlesome government. There is no benefit to the citizen, and plenty of downsides.

            If you think that these days nobody can already build a complete profile of you you're pretty wrong.

            the SSN and your drivers license alone are enough to track you.

            What needs to be done is to re-do the privacy laws in the US (and Canada) instead of hoping that the companies are "honest"
      • The US started differently than European nations, and has a long history of distrust of the government.

        That's by no means unique to Americans. I'm European, and I distrust the US government, too.

    • Re:What's wrong with national IDs? (Score:5, Interesting)

      by SquadBoy ( 167263 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:06PM (#7125983) Homepage Journal
      Becuase they do not buy any security and they open many holes.
      You may trust your government enough to know everything about you and to keep it all in one great big database but you have to keep in mind that here in America we don't so much. In fact we are an entire country founded on the thought that the government should get the fuck out of our lives. National IDs do nothing for security they do nothing to prevent idenitity theft they do nothing but put all of your personal info in one database that can be abused by those who have access to it and broken into and abused by those who do not. In Beyond Fear Bruce goes through this with the 5 step process. You spend a large amount of money and get nothing in return.

      Think about it for a moment and I can only speak for the US but I'll walk you through the process.

      I have a drivers license and a Social Security card. With those two forms of ID I can get any other form of ID that we have here in the US. Those two pieces of ID are in turn based on a birth cert. You can get a birth cert for a couple of hundred dollars. To implement a national ID they would have to figure out someway to figure out who everybody is and at this point it is impossible to prove who anyone is beyond accepting what their current IDs say. See the problem yet?

      So national IDs will just give you another ID that says that you are who you claim to be. But if I don't like being that person anymore it would take a couple of hundred dollars and a bit of time to be someone else. There is *no* way that you can prove that anyone is anyone. Trying to do so is pointless and will merely cause problems for honest folks.
      • So national IDs will just give you another ID that says that you are who you claim to be

        Yes and no.

        The national ID would be the only ID you would need. No more SSN or Drivers License (which is stupid anyways), no more haggeling over it, AND because the document is a federal government it should be harder to forge (doesn't mean it can't be).

        The idea of a National ID card isn't that bad, the problem just is that the way data in the US is handled it won't accomplish a thing. At least not for the people who
      • You say: "In fact we are an entire country founded on the thought that the government should get the fuck out of our lives." Sorry, but that's just not the case, and I think any one of the Founders would tell you so. In fact, my computer is currently running off power generated by several of them spinning in their graves at this Libertarian variation on the Big Lie.
    • In reality, the US has a national ID system, consisting of your drivers license and your SSN (with your birth certificate thrown in occasionally). It simply is a bad one, poorly administered, insecure, and rife with identity theft and fraud. Why doesn't it get fixed?

      Who knows. Probably a combination of stupidity, xenophobia ("the Europeans are doing it--it can't be any good"), crooks like it (and they get to vote and lobby, too), and because it is enormously profitable for some, like companies that make

      • ...companies that make a living out of collecting data about you, aggregating it, and providing that information to others. A good system of national IDs with good privacy legislation would make those companies redundant.

        Why would they? Just because you have an ID card doesn't have anything to do with the collection of personal data. I have a national ID card, and neither is that itself used to create a personality profile of me, nor does it hinder lots of companies to earn money by spying on me. The only

        • Why would they?

          First of all, a national ID system would almost certainly come with stronger privacy legislation, something that would make a lot of the current data collection and exchange practices in the US illegal.

          Also, a large part of the work involved in keeping databases on people has to do with figuring out who they are and whether two pieces of information refer to the same person. A reliable, secure identification system would mean that institutions might not have to outsource that work at all.

      • Re:there is a national ID system (Score:4, Interesting)

        by AJWM ( 19027 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:57PM (#7126504) Homepage
        And California is about to massively devalue that ID by issuing drivers licenses to undocumented (aka illegal) aliens.

        Logically, every other state in the union should refuse to recognize a CA drivers license as a valid ID, except maybe as proof of the ability to drive a car (about the same utility as the "international drivers license" you can get). I'm sure Californians will be real happy when TSA stops accepting their DLs as valid ID next time they try to board a plane.

        You want a national ID? Get a passport.
        • And California is about to massively devalue that ID by issuing drivers licenses to undocumented (aka illegal) aliens.

          Which would do wonders for fraud in California. You see, the problem is that the California driver's license, for no damn good reason, is trusted way too much. I could do more harm with a California license than any other state ID or license card.

          California issues out no less than 25,000 ID cards per day and even at an amazing rate of accuracy and security, you would still be looking at
        • And California is about to massively devalue that ID by issuing drivers licenses to undocumented (aka illegal) aliens.

          You are absolutely right: what a marvelous benefit. That alone makes me want to support that proposal.

          Driver's licenses are for driving an automobile, not for anything else. If California's move causes people not to use them for other purposes, that's a great step forward. Let's hope the other 49 states will "devalue" their driver's licenses in the same way.
    • some people somehow have this notion from some alarmist that says they'll check that ID everywhere you go and track you from point to point.

      IMO, simple legislation that provides baseline standards for government-issued ID cards (eg, driver licenses) to have anti-fraud features are all that's needed.

      I live in NJ, the state with the license that's easiest to forge. It's easy for someone to walk into a DMV, claim to be so-and-so, and say that they've lost their license. All you need is something like mothe
      • IMO, simple legislation that provides baseline standards for government-issued ID cards (eg, driver licenses) to have anti-fraud features are all that's needed.

        You obviously don't track this stuff closely. There've been a couple of states that have done something along these lines, complete with "unforgeable" drivers licenses.

        The result was DMV offices being broken into and blank cards and the machines to make them being stolen.
      • I live in NJ, the state with the license that's easiest to forge.

        Yes...but the advantage is that NJ doesn't have very much severe fraud committed with the photo driver's licenses (and non-photo licenses.) Everyone knows they can be easily forged so no one trusts them for all that much. As things go, I rather have some under age alcohol consumption than serious credit/financial fraud (which is far more severe in states with much more "secure" licenses, like California or Texas.)

    • Given the current circumstances, not much.

      I wouldn't say that, but it's a sham argument to distract us. They already have a national id card. Actually, more than one. If you're a male it's illegal for much of your life not to carry a draft card. Certainly for the ages that they are most concerned about (18-35), I'm not sure about later. Women are generally more trusted, so they rely on the secondary id's: Driver's license and "taxpayer ID #" (it was originally the social service ID, and we were prom
    • If you'd like to learn how it has made you less free, perhaps you'll ask your government to issue John Ashcroft a work visa, so he can run your interior ministry for a few years.

      You will soon see....

    • I don't understand why Americans are so afraid of national ID cards. Where I live we have standardized national ID cards that are used in most situations, and I can't say how it has made me any less free.

      In the modern world, we are counted and registered with our government. What is wrong with having a standardized card to show who we are?

      It is the counting and registering that bothers many Americans, not the card. Americans have good reason to be distrustful of the federal government's attempts

    • I don't understand why Americans are so afraid of national ID cards.

      Read the book. This is one of the cases that he analyzes. The questions to ask about national ID cards is the same as for any security measure: what assets are you trying to protect, what threats are you trying to protect against, how well does this measure work to reduce the risks from those threats, what new threats does it introduce, and so on.

      I can see ways in which a national ID card could be useful. I do not see that it could

    • I don't understand why Americans are so afraid of national ID cards. Where I live we have standardized national ID cards that are used in most situations, and I can't say how it has made me any less free.

      It should be said at this point that every country's experience with ID cards is very different. Many European countries use them for mostly bureaucratic functions (functions which are done in other countries, without difficulty, without ID cards. In fact, I like to say, if you don't have ID card fraud, t

  • "Not for you"? (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Skyshadow ( 508 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:46PM (#7125760) Homepage
    Key bit from the review:

    ...he describes a five-step process to analyze any particular security system or practice. The process helps you make sure you understand what you are protecting, what the tradeoffs are, and whether, in the end if it is worthwhile to implement the system.

    This might seem like common sense, but a IMO *lot* of otherwise Clueful people could use having this sort of process tatooed in reverse on their forehead so they'd have to review it every morning when they looked in the mirror.

    The trouble with any job that involves detail and careful attention is that the forest tends to duck behind all the damned trees, and this is especially true for IT. Hell, look at all the /.'ers in our recent discussions about programs or products that are "useless" or "should have waited longer to be released" because it doesn't provide absolute security, whereas in reality security is a *step by step* type of deal, not one of absolutes.

    Anyhow, in my experience it often benefits even the "experts" to have the blatently obvious spelled out in this way and laid out before them. Security isn't alone here -- this goes for just about all disciplines, IT or not. Given that, I think it's dangerous to dismiss something like this as too basic.

  • Boldly over-optimistic (Score:3, Funny)

    by Rosco P. Coltrane ( 209368 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:46PM (#7125765)
    I am sure most Slashdot readers know Schneier's name and his work.

    Oh sure,if he's from soviet russia and he, for one, welcomes 1-2-3-profiting from first posts, I'm sure most Slashdot readers know him.

  • Is he reading too much into people? (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:47PM (#7125776)
    Fear is a strong word. I don't think getting an alarm system is evidence that you are cringing in fear, or even feeling fear. It may be a sensible step in a practical plan to simply be prepared. Obviously there are exceptions; some people truly are fearful, but I doubt most are.

    One mistake Schnier tends to make is to ascribe certain thoughts to others that may not be there at all. For example, he seems to think that anyone who has a security system of any kind (software, hardware, etc.) assumes that system will be invincible. He then goes on to attack that assumption, without stopping to realize that the assumption he is attacking is not one that is actually held by most people. Now his new attack, on "fear" this time (that he thinks everyone with security systems must have), is of the same form.

    However, over the years his all-or-nothing approach has mellowed, fortunately; since he is so influential, it's good that he is starting to see things less as black and white and more in terms of tradeoffs. The old view that poor security equals no security is easily debunked by pointing out that virtually all security systems in place everywhere are penetrable, yet they remain effective in the aggregate.

    Bottom line: Beyond Fear is just a good title. Let's hope he doesn't really think that locking your car door is firm evidence that you are quaking in your boots.

    • Re:Is he reading too much into people? (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Anonymous Coward

      One mistake Schnier tends to make is to ascribe certain thoughts to others that may not be there at all. For example, he seems to think that anyone who has a security system of any kind (software, hardware, etc.) assumes that system will be invincible. He then goes on to attack that assumption, without stopping to realize that the assumption he is attacking is not one that is actually held by most people.

      Schnier has spent years in the fields of Crypto and security. He's seen a lot of people who have exa

    • From what I have read of Schnier, which admittedly has only included the work of the past several years, including the first several chapters of AC, and does not include, as of now, Beyond Fear, I find his statement to be based on the behavior of individuals and not on a priori assumptions.

      Your security system example provides a good case in point. Many people do buy them out of fear. A security system at best provides a limited time for the intruder to spend on a premises before risking apprehension.

  • Crypto (Score:3, Interesting)

    by Otter ( 3800 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @01:47PM (#7125791) Journal
    The process helps you make sure you understand what you are protecting, what the tradeoffs are, and whether, in the end if it is worthwhile to implement the system.

    This is precisely why I don't bother with any encryption that isn't built in. Browser encryption - fine. Using PGP or RMSPG on my email -- as Dogbert asked, "Who would want to read your mail?" There is too much hassle involved, just on my end, never mind getting my sister or mother in law to read encrypted email. Unless you make a fetish of it for your own sake or you're sending something genuinely worth protecting, who cares?

    • Re:Crypto (Score:5, Insightful)

      by CGP314 ( 672613 ) <CGP@ColinGregor y P a lmer.net> on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:04PM (#7125962) Homepage
      This is precisely why I don't bother with any encryption that isn't built in. Browser encryption - fine. Using PGP or RMSPG on my email -- as Dogbert asked, "Who would want to read your mail?" There is too much hassle involved, just on my end, never mind getting my sister or mother in law to read encrypted email. Unless you make a fetish of it for your own sake or you're sending something genuinely worth protecting, who cares?

      Well, the idea is if you only send important email in encrypted form, then the important email is easy to spot and brute force. But if you encrypt everything, then brute force is not such a viable option.

      That's the idea anyway, but I'm with you. I tried to use PGP for a while, but none of the people I emailed had any idea what it was, and didn't have the inclination to learn.

      • Well, the idea is that the criminals, pedophiles, etc. want us all to use encryption all the time because it provides a forest for them to hide in.

        Something about:

        First they came for the pedophiles, and I didn't say anything.


        Then they came for the criminals, and I didn't do anything.

        They haven't come for me, and it's a lot nicer out on the streets at night lately. Go figure.


        Or do I have the meme wrong?
    • There is a periodic effort to get PGP or GPG signing included in Mozilla. I haven't seen any results, though you might consider using KMail. I don't know about any of the others.

      N.B.: you said "built into the browser". I translated that into "built into the e-mail program". I hope this was correct. Browser based encryption is present in most browsers. (In Mozilla it's represented by that little padlock icon. If the padlock is closed, then you're in encrypted mode.)

      N.B.B.: I'm not sure about the v
      • N.B.: you said "built into the browser". I translated that into "built into the e-mail program". I hope this was correct.

        No, I meant that I use encryption when it's given to me seamlessly. As you say, using a browser in encrypted mode is routine, so I'm happy to use it. Same for ssh and sftp. If email clients provided that same level of routine integration, great! Obviously, though, it's a lot easier to implement encryption when the hard work can be delegated to a server admin, as with ssh or httpd.

      • I don't believe PGP and friends' purpose is encryption; that's merely a side benefit. The problem PGP is designed to solve is authentication: how do you really know fred@foobar.co.uk is J. Fred Foobar of Liverpool?

        People don't generally perceive a need for that. My mom, for instance, only emails people she has met IRL and exchanged addresses with anyway. Spam and other scam mails (including the ever-popular "Customers want to use credit cards, so give us your bank account number", supposedly from Merchant
      • Eudora email has a pgp plug in that works just fine. According to a PGP article [mindspring.com] so do Lookout Express, Pegasus and Groupwise.
    • Well, I went through the same way of thinking as you. But lately when all these privacy issues seem to came more and more to out attention it seems we should defend it.
      Personally I hope that if I start using signing / encrypting and get my friends to do the same, I've helped the privacy advocates a little. I say this because I loath the idea " If you are honest, what do you have to hide? ".
      I lived in a communist country and I know what it meens government control and I don't want other contries to go on tha
  • It is amusing to watch Schneier walk a political tight-rope in many chapters, carefully pointing out that some issues come down to personal value judgments. He tries his best not to take sides but I feel the work is somewhat politically biased. e.g. I object to his assertion that airline pilots shouldn't be trusted with guns, simply because that is not their primary area of expertise. And I don't agree with his model of US military intervention - basically that intervention leads to anti-Americanism which l
    • I object to his assertion that airline pilots shouldn't be trusted with guns, simply because that is not their primary area of expertise.

      I for one do not want airframe-piercing tools anywhere in the plane. If, against all the odds, someone manages to smuggle a gun in and takes over the plane, I'd rather have it stop there. I don't want a fucking gunfight inside the plane.

      this leaves out the potential for positive social and economic intervention to weaken extremist positions.

      Positive social and econom

    • From time to time we hear of drunk pilots being dragged off the plane. All it takes is one wingnut pissed off about paying child support and we have a big problem.

      Better to keep the pilots unarmed. Have air marshals on random flights, and secure the cockpit door vs. even them.

      • If the pilot is disgruntled and wants to kill passengers, he doesn't need a gun. He could just crash the plane. If you're worried about drunk pilots on the plane having guns, why aren't you worried about air marshals having guns. Is it impossible for them to get drunk? Or do they not get disgruntled? Hardly anyone is aware of it, but there has been a documented case of an armed airline pilot stopping at attempted hijacking: http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m0BTA/2002_March - April/83280949/p1/article.jht
        • If his copilot can complicate his attempt to crash the plane, a disgruntled pilot would find a gun useful. An ambushed copilot wouldn't have a chance to return fire. Advantage: wingnut

          My point about drunk pilots (at least two sets on commercial airlines in the last few years) was that they are not perfectly reliable. As a class, they are more reliable than most any other grouping, but it's too big a group. I think the odds of a dangerous wingnut also being drunk are low. Either variable - drunk, or win

  • The administration doesn't want you to read this (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Animats ( 122034 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @02:04PM (#7125964) Homepage
    This might lead people to realize that the US has overreacted to Al-Queda, Iraq, and street crime, while underreacting to Enron, SARS, and North Korea.

    For US government regulatory purposes, the value of a human life ranges from about $1.1 million to about $6 million. (1999 dollars). The current administration would prefer smaller numbers, because environmental and safety regulations are measured against those values. (1 CFR s305-88-7). So the Enron collapse, at $40 billion, equates to about 7,000 lives. [fsu.edu]

    Yet Ken Lay is still at large.

  • I read the book, and I wished over and over that my representatives would read it to.

    Next best thing: quote it in letters to my representatives.
  • Wait until the RIAA hears about this:
    This book is soon going to find its way into hands of friends and relations who need to think about security
  • I am sure most Slashdot readers know Schneier's name and his work.

    "Hi, I'm Bruce Schneier! You may have remembered me from my other books, 'A Long Day's Journey Out From Fright', and 'Security is a Well-Patched Mac'."

  • We NEED to use SSN's as identifiers (Score:3, Insightful)

    by bill_mcgonigle ( 4333 ) on Friday October 03, 2003 @03:45PM (#7127080) Homepage Journal
    I have written my local representative that while his recent bill to remove SSNs from insurance cards is nice, it's far too late (and how about just getting people to stop using SSN's as identifiers?

    The cat's out of the bag already. Pretending that SSN's are somehow secret was dubious enough thirty years ago, but is just plain reckless today. It's this coy game of 'if you know your SSN you must be you even though we know that's not true' that has allowed identify theft [pbs.org] to proliferate.

    Instead we need to just say, "this is my National ID # - use it for whatever you damn well please" - at that point people will have to start looking for real security solutions instead of the crazy half-baked ineffective one they're trifling with now.

    Of course, this can't be done electively - there needs to be a national cutover date with probably 2 years notice (then at least 2 years of delays). All that needs to be done is to get Congress, the IRS, the President, and 'Privacy Advocates' on board. No problem.

  • Didn't he play the cop in all those Jaws movies?

    I also liked him as Heywood Floyd in "2010".

  • Beyond Fear (Score:3, Interesting)

    by herwin ( 169154 ) <herwin@nOspAm.theworld.com> on Friday October 03, 2003 @05:00PM (#7127821) Homepage Journal
    I teach security to novices, and I have found Bruce's books extremely useful resources. As soon as read Beyond Fear, I incorporated some of his ideas in my lectures (although I expanded the 5-step process to 6 steps for the students). Well recommended.

  • Talking to non-techies (Score:3, Interesting)

    by isomeme ( 177414 ) <cdberry@gmail.com> on Friday October 03, 2003 @05:22PM (#7128012) Journal
    I was chief architect several years ago at a pioneering (and now dead) movies-over-the-net company. Beyond the technical issues involved, our biggest problem was movie-industry execs who insisted on "absolute, guaranteed, unbreakable" security. Needless to say, this was a bit of a stumbling block, as there's no such thing.

    When I gave security-related presentations to non-techies, I got in the habit of asking for a show of hands asking who had locked their front door when they left home that morning. Needless to say, all hands went up. I'd then point out that a thief could break a window, tunnel through a wall, dig up through the floor, cut a hole in the roof, or batter down a door if they were determined enough to get inside...so why did they bother locking the front door? Thinking about this got people into a more reasonable mindset to discuss cost/benefit ratios and attack scenario analysis.

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