Brave New Ballot

Ben Rothke writes "In an important new book Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting, Avi Rubin writes 'too often in American life, when it comes to divisive issues, the facts can be less important than the weight of public opinion'. That basically sums up Rubin's story in this fascinating story of his frustrations in dealing with government and corporate officials in his quest to show that e-voting was not as secure as it was originally made out to be." Read the rest of Ben's review.

Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting
author	Aviel Rubin
pages	272
publisher	Morgan Road Books
rating	10
reviewer	Ben Rothke
ISBN	0767922107
summary	Electronic voting systems are being deployed with inadequate levels of trust and security

Brave New Ballot (BNB) is Rubin's story of how in 2003, he and his graduate students at Johns Hopkins University demonstrated that the Diebold Election Systems electronic voting technology in wide use was full of security problems. It was just in 2002 that Sherron Watkins of Enron was named Time magazine person of the year for her work in uncovering fraud at Enron. It would have been thought that Rubin's work would have immediately won him some sort of patriot of the year award for his work.

While the accolades were indeed many, his team's research was maligned as being that of a homework assignment, and the Administrator for Elections for the state of Maryland (where Rubin lives and works) publicly stated that 'computer scientists (a direct reference to Rubin and his team) who question the security of electronic voting machines are undermining our democracy.' Such a scenario makes up much of the story that the book tells in Rubin's team's efforts to blow the whistle on unsecure e-voting machines.

As to the Administrator for Elections for the state of Maryland and her disdain for computer scientists, she would likely find constituents such as the zombie-like Stepford wives more to her liking. Unfortunately, she ended up with Professor Rubin.

It is not that secure electronic voting is inherently unattainable. Rather, nearly all of the commercial solutions that have shipped to date have not been adequate designed with security in mind. This is due to many factors, some of which are that the makers of these devices do not completely understand the security risks and countermeasures, in addition to public officials who are far too trusting of these commercial e-voting vendors.

The early chapters of the book detail how Rubin's team analyzed the security and cryptography used within extremely sloppy coding of the Diebold Accuvote-TS director recording electronic device. One particularly humorous incident is when the Diebold programmers reference Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography in their C++ code for their decision of which algorithm to use of a for pseudorandom number generation. The only problem is that Applied Cryptography states that the specific algorithm they used should specifically not be utilized for random number generation. Rubin comically states about that incident that Diebold should have consulted with Schneier, rather than have their staff misunderstand what they read in his book.

I had a similar frustrating incident when consulting on an e-voting systems some years ago. The lead developer (who obviously was no expert in cryptography) documented that the e-voting system used 120-bit encryption. Upon analysis, we found that the system was using 40-bit encryption. When countered about that, the developer replied that they perform the 40-bit encryption routine three times using the same key, for an effective 120-bit key length. Of course, 40-bit encryption will always be (insecure) 40-bit encryption, no matter how many iterations he put it through; but it is frightening that he did not know that.

After his team presented their report in 2003, Rubin writes in detail how Diebold started a smear campaign against him. Not only was it Diebold, but also election officials in municipalities that had deployed the Accuvote-TS system that also maligned Rubin. This was done primarily by misinterpreting his objections, and also by refusing to pay attention to other independent reports on the insecurity of the devices.

For a more timely and somewhat humorous account of how insecure Diebold really is, see 'Hotel Minibar Key Opens Diebold Voting Machines'.

Being a whistle-blower always takes a toll on a person and Rubin was no different. He work on e-voting consumed him and took a toll on his family, career and his students. The book chronicles how Rubin found himself caught in a crossfire between big business, partisan politics, and overworked election officials. Rubin also found himself between the crosshairs of the ITAA (Information Technology Association of America), powerful vendor-based lobbying group. The ITAA, of which Diebold was a client, attempted to discredit him on many occasions, but their evidence was always weak and reckless, and in the end only served to bolster Rubin's claims against the Diebold systems.

Part of the absurd claims of the ITAA was that the open-source movement is using the issue of e-voting security to wage a 'religious war' that pits open-source software against proprietary software. Rubin could have filed chapters with similar ITAA absurdities, but wisely chose not to.

Similarly, an article I wrote 'E-Voting: It's Security, Stupid' also was the recipient of the wrathful ITAA reply. In their so-called rebuttal mistakenly titled 'E-Voting Does Work', Harris Miller of the ITAA follows his modus operandi of first attacking the person, avoiding the issue, stating vague meaningless comments, and concluding the issue by missing the point.

99% of the voting public does not know about backdoors, insecure code, Trojan Horses, insider threats, and scores of other security issues that the e-voting vendors have yet failed to fully address. The election process as we know it is rapidly being migrated to these electronic voting machines that are replacing the older, but more reliable mechanical systems.

BNB is a timely and important book as it details the very real defects on which these e-voting systems are built on (and Windows is only one of them). The ITAA made claims such that the only vulnerability within e-voting is that of a rogue programmer conspiring to steal public office. Such politicking only serves to confuse the issue for a public that is inherently trustful of these voting machines. Yet if these e-voting machines were built to the same stringencies and regulations that the aviation and pharmaceutical industry faces, they would never make it within a mile of a voting booth.

Brave New Ballot is to e-voting what Rachel Carson's Silent Spring is to the global environmental movement. It is a vitally important book that details the problem of e-voting and what can be done in the future to make certain that it can one day be carried out in a secure manner.

Of course, the image of an embedded crypto key or plaintext password in an e-voting system does not convey the same impact on the public as that of a thalidomide baby. Pictures of thalidomide babies caused heads to roll at the FDA, and one should hope the that the publication of Brave New Ballot will awaken the public from their slumber on the topic of electronic voting, and encourage the Election Assistance Commission to immediately ban electronic voting until it can be secured.

Deforest Soaries, the first Chairman of the United States Election Assistance Commission sums it up best when he states 'If the integrity of our sacred right of voting is less important than partisan politics, corporate interests, or bureaucratic systems, then shame on us for presenting ourselves as the global standard bearers of democracy. As Brave New Ballot shows, there is a lot of shame going around.

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You can purchase Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.

public opinion is more important

but surely in a democracy, public opinion is more important than anything else, it is how we elect officials. Therefore the concern should be how we educate the public to the facts to allow a fully educated public opinion rather than try to replace the opinion with fact.

Harris Miller is not a good representative

Of American IT. As the article above states:
Similarly, an article I wrote 'E-Voting: It's Security, Stupid' also was the recipient of the wrathful ITAA reply. In their so-called rebuttal mistakenly titled 'E-Voting Does Work', Harris Miller of the ITAA follows his modus operandi of first attacking the person, avoiding the issue, stating vague meaningless comments, and concluding the issue by missing the point.

Yep, that's exactly been my experience with the ITAA- they're not so much interested in facts as truthiness.

CS Supports Al Queda

"computer scientists (a direct reference to Rubin and his team) who question the security of electronic voting machines are undermining our democracy"

And don't forget support al Queda.

What an ass. Don't question the government. They know what's best for you.

Excessive Complexity for a Simple Solution

The solution to e-ballots can be easily stated in 4 simple steps.

1. Each electronic vote is recorded onto a paper log.

2. The voter keeps a paper receipt.

3. A challenge by any candidate results in a recount of the paper log.

4. A voter who doubts the accurate registering of her vote can go to the appropriate government office to check her vote against the paper log.

Why do we need a 272-page book to elaborate further?

What perplexes me even more is why some state governments actually allowed e-voting without a paper trail?

Re:Excessive Complexity for a Simple Solution

Why the hell do you want to take a recipt out the door with you? That's a terrible idea.

A much better idea is to have it print out a short slip with your choices clearly printed on there. You then drop that slip in a box on the way out and if there is any question as to the accuracy of the machines the pollworkers just have to crack open the box and go through all of the recipts. After the voting is complete and the elections are done, a few random counties should have their boxes double checked as well, just to verify that nothing is screwey with any of the electronic tabluation equipment.

Can we PLEASE

Can we PLEASE get copies of this book sent to the election officials of every state? How about getting Avi a spot on Leno, or maybe one of the popular daytime talk shows?

The general public does not know about the shit that goes on behind closed doors. They need to be told!

"Age of Electronic voting?

It seems based on the review that the best way to win "The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting" would be to, you know, not be in the age of electronic voting. You know, not electronically vote. There's no way the cost savings can justify all the new opportunities for cheating that it allows.

Of course, I wouldn't be satisfied by anything but publishing the voters' choices. Not by name -- give them an anonymous unique voter ID so that they look at the database, they can say "ah, they got mine right".

Re:"Age of Electronic voting?

Of course, I wouldn't be satisfied by anything but publishing the voters' choices. Not by name -- give them an anonymous unique voter ID so that they look at the database, they can say "ah, they got mine right".

And then, as you leave the polling place, a big guy mugs you, copies down your 'anonymous' voter ID along with your name (or just steals the voter ID and your ID), and delivers it to his boss. Hope you voted for the person they wanted you to... or else! In other words, you've just opened up the voting public to bullying.

The real solution to e-voting can be found at the Open Voting Consortium [openvotingconsortium.org].

Undetectable Fraud Undermines Democracy!

the Administrator for Elections for the state of Maryland (where Rubin lives and works) publicly stated that 'computer scientists (a direct reference to Rubin and his team) who question the security of electronic voting machines are undermining our democracy.'

Our democracy has existed for 230 years. Electronic voting do little to nothing to expand democracy. What they do expand is the possibilities for hard to detect fraud -- something which *does* undermine our democracy.

Government and corporate officials

Government and corporate officials quoted in response to the article: "LALALALALALALALA! I CAN'T HEAR YOU!"

People complain about the voting machine

but rarely on the method used to determine the winner. Plurality, to put it bluntly, sucks. Instant Runoff Voting is only marginally better. If we were smart, we'd either go with Approval -- just replace "Vote for one" with "Vote for one or more", so it's no more difficult -- or with a Condorcet method (which uses the same ballots as IRV without some of the more annoying paradoxes).

Shakin' in my boots...

"the facts can be less important than the weight of public opinion"

That may be the scariest thing I've ever heard.

What book review?

There was no book review here, just the "reviewer"s aimless ramblings and anecdotes relating to the topic of the book. He does little if anything to actually, you know, REVIEW THE BOOK. Nice to see that spellchecking is still not a priority though.

My /. journal entry on this subject

I cobbled together some ideas a couple weeks ago. Comments welcome.
--
Ballot ideas 9/6/06

Goal:
1) voting by handicapped voters with minimal assistance
2) voter-verified audit trail
3) cost-reduced versions available where needed
4) quick count available to the press within minutes

Read the rest... [slashdot.org] and give your feedback.

Not as secure as it was originally made out to be

Paper ballots? How quaint!.. The Floridian "poor", you see, were disproportionatly confused by them — much easier to have them use computers, which even a retired librarian, overseing the voting station on election day, will be able fix and to spot any and all possible tampering with...

Mexico and Thailand

You secure the electronic vote, you get a paper trail. Is that enough?
No, you get what happened in Mexico, where the paper trail is not checked.

Mexico, the ballots report at random, it is clear the encumbant is losing, at about 75%, a funny thing happens, ballots start coming in with huge swings to the encumbant and the challengers vote switched to a third party. The vote swings.

The election authority says its counted 98.5% of the vote but has only counted 92.5%.
The challenger says '3 million votes are missing', the election authority ridicules this, then later 'finds' 2.5 million of the missing votes. Finally they refuse to manually publicly count the votes. Instead they count only a few with totals different from the tally sheet, but if you make up the numbers its a lot easier to get those numbers to match than if you're counting the ballots, and the interesting boxes are not examined.

http://www.gregpalast.com/we-dont-need-no-stinkin- recount [gregpalast.com]

Even if you get the ballot checked, look at Thailand.
Thaksin is unpopular in Bangkok, the army takes command, drives tanks into the government, TV and into the Kings palace. The popular king is no longer seen, the army is told they are following the kings orders, and the coup plotters pretend to speak for the king. If you believe the polls they are putting out, 85% of Thais like the coup, they think the king is controlling it. But if 85% of Thais wanted Thaksin out, then the vote was next month, they could vote him out. Where is the King?

Meanwhile the men with the big tanks claim this is a popular coup and election will follow next year. But election were due next month. Due you think they will allow a government critical of the army actions? No way, dictators can never leave power for fear of arrest. So Thailand will sink into a military dictatorship for years to come.

Democracy is a constant fight, it doesn't stop at the ballot.

Democrats pressed for e-voting ...

In the angst of the 2000 election, the major alleged "breakdowns of democracy" occurred in jurisdictions where Democrats administered the elections.

Every step since then to press for e-voting was initiated, fought for, and demagogued by Democrats.

When paper ballots were left behind at their urging, displacing rhetoric about "disenfranchisement" and the "intent of the voter", the Democrats did a 180 and made their pet e-voting the culprit, invented balderdash hokum about Diebold and spun it all as a conspiracy by Bush.

The fact is, the system *worked* in 2000, we had a secure transition of power, we kept local officials and particularly local/state jurists from disrupting a federal Presidential election, and ... no tanks in the streets. Thanks goodness for a final arbiter. You may not like the path the Supreme Court chose, but if you want a different course, please go win some elections handedly.

Private Voting, Public Counting

The United States of America uses the "Australian Ballot" form of voting. That means everyone gets a secret ballot [wikipedia.org] and the ballots are counted publicly. It was then, as it remains now, the best design to accommodate our system of elections. Please understand this essential reality before suggesting "improvements" (e.g. receipts, mail ballots, etc.).

Someone in this thread is going to state that HAVA 2002 mandates the use of electronic voting machines (aka "DRE" or direct recording electronic). That is false, as thoroughly explained in Voters Unite's Myth Breakers [votersunite.org] document.

Someone in this thread will make some statement about how electronic voting devices permit the disabled to vote in private. That's not exactly true. To the best of my knowledge, the existing products do not preserve the secret ballot. Nor are they particularly accessible. Meanwhile, there are solutions which do preserve the secret ballot and are accessible to disabled voters. Such as ES&S's AutoMark, the Vote-PAD, and EqualiVote. (There are some other novel systems, too. I just haven't researched them yet.)

Someone in this thread is going to state that electronic voting is just splendid, and we can make it work, if we just try harder next time. Fine. Show me. Then let's talk. Meanwhile, all current systems suck.

Someone in this thread is going to suggest that we have all paper ballots counted manually. Like Canada. Or Germany. It's not a bad idea. But it wouldn't work in the USA with our current constraints and expectations. To contrast, in Canada, the races are very simple and so the tabulation is feasible. In Germany, they have proportional representation and rely on their superior form of exit polls. Meaning their system is very tolerant of errors. And they have legions of civil servants working weeks to get the exact manual tally. Whereas here in the USA, politicians and news networks demand results now, now, now!

Someone in this thread may suggest it's all about the Republicans. Or the Democrats. It hasn't proven that simple. I believe it's a fight between the people in power, who want to stay in power, and us voters. I'm a pretty progressive guy. But I readily acknowledge the bad guys (with respect to election integrity) here in King County Washington are in the Democratic leadership. (My experience is that the rank and file of both major parties are completely on board with election integrity.)

Someone in this thread may also suggest that we eliminate the need for electronic voting at poll sites by transistioning to forced mail voting (100% vote by mail). Like Oregon State has done and where most of Washington State is heading. It's terribly idea. No more secret ballot. No more public vote count. Higher error rate. Huge more expensive. Long-term decline in voter turnout. It's a big topic. We've been researching it for about 9 months and have only scratched the surface. We discuss

Someone in this thread will also exhort the necessity of using a voter verified paper audit trail. They may even encourage others to support Rush Holt's HR 550. Unfortunately, the VVPAT is a placebo. What guarantees what's recorded is what's printed? Nothing. And experiences to date demonstrate that actually auditing the VVPAT is infeasible (1h 15m per ballot cast). That said, the efforts of VerifiedVoting.org and other are not misguided. Many states already have electronic voting machines without the VVPAT. So passing HR 550 would be better than nothing.

The take away point is this:

The most reliable, secure way to vote in the USA today is to use voter-correctable precinct-based optical scanners. That means paper ballots at poll sites fed into a ballot scanner.

Please support Voter Action [voteraction.org]. They have successfully prevented the use and procurement of electronic voting machines in a few states already. They are expanding the fight as fast as they can

FDA & Thalidomide

Pictures of thalidomide babies caused heads to roll at the FDA...

Actually, thalidomide [wikipedia.org] was one of the FDA's great successes...the drug was never approved in the US; most of the birth defects happened in Europe. It's one of the reason the FDA's drug approval process is so slow relative to other countries.

Thalidomide an the FDA

Of course, the image of an embedded crypto key or plaintext password in an e-voting system does not convey the same impact on the public as that of a thalidomide baby. Pictures of thalidomide babies caused heads to roll at the FDA,
It's worth noting that the FDA, and in particular, Frances Kathleen Oldham actually DID THEIR JOB, and did NOT approve thalidomide for sale in the U.S. I remember my mom mentioning this. Being born in 1961, that could have been me flapping around. Not to worry, that level of safeguard is probably not in place today with the drug compaines responsible for doing all of their own trials.

Proof that e-voting doesn't work.

If anyone missed the article by Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in Rolling Stone, "Was the 2004 Election Stolen?", I'd suggest reading it. There are a few [well cited] examples of e-voting sucking the big one and/or how the machines were manipulated. http://politics.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/09/ 17/1845248 [slashdot.org]

The public doesn't get it....

I recently had a discussion with a friend about this whole Diebold mess, and how the public just has no clue about the vulnerabilities. I'm beginning to feel that an election version of "9/11" is the only way to do it. Have a bunch of operatives volunteer to work an election in some district and then, on election day, have the machines report twice as many votes as there are registered voters... and have them all be for the Green party or something. Until then, the sheeple will think that it's all ivory-tower theoretical stuff. They need to be shown that a real election can really be stolen.

Of course, this will mean jail time for the perps, but I have two things to say about that. 1) Some would consider that a small price to pay for preserving democracy. 2) You might be able to get a light sentence if you mailed, before the election, some letters (saying "Do not open until after the election" on them) to several news agencies declaring that you are going to rig the election in order to expose the dangers to our democracy.

A book about e-voting?

"You wont be able to put it down" said some guy who read half of it before becoming suicidaly bored.

We have even more problems

eVoting was a bad idea all right, but it's far from the only problem we have. We have very weak systems to assure that the person voting isn't committing fraud, regardless of the voting method being used. For example, here in California, it's explicitly forbidden to ask the person for a photo ID. I can walk up to a poll, say I'm Mr. So-and-so living at address blah blah, and even if the poll worker knows me to be someone else, s/he can't make me prove my identity. While we should be concerned about fraud being perpetrated with the voting systems we use, we should be equally concerned with the other sources of fraud as well.

How can anyone be so off?

It is not that secure electronic voting is inherently unattainable. Rather, nearly all of the commercial solutions that have shipped to date have not been adequate designed with security in mind. This is due to many factors, some of which are that the makers of these devices do not completely understand the security risks and countermeasures, in addition to public officials who are far too trusting of these commercial e-voting vendors.

The people in government are choosing the machines based on their hackabality.

When the CEO of Dibold tells GWB that he can deliver OHIO, he gets it done.

Why does everyone always pussyfoot around this?

It's going to keep up until some college kids sneak a camera into an active voting booth and film the swap as it's being done by dedicated republicans.

At that point, it will turn out to be a single, horrible terrorist loving republican, no others would do that (Even though the descrepancies showed up across the nation in the last election)

So, this poor kid will be prosecuted as will this One Evil Republican (Much the way only enlisted people were prosecuted in the torture scandle) and it will all go away.

America has been taken over by fundamentalist extremists.

Learn to live with it or do something about it (and voting is NOT doing something).
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Hell Yeah I'm posting this anynomously!

Another Source of info about E-voting Problems

Another source of info about e-voting problems is BlackBoxVoting.org [blackboxvoting.org]. They have a free pdf book on their webpage. A couple of years ago I skimmed through a few chapters of it. Starting on chapter 9 [blackboxvoting.org] they talk about accidentally finding an unsecured FTP server and downloading 40,000 files, including the sofware for the Diebold voting machines such as BallotStation.exe, GEMS.exe, and VCProgrammer.exe. They discovered that Diebold's secret proprietary software had various unacceptable security problems. It is surprising to see that a company, like Diebold, that makes ATM machines has created such insecure software and hardware. As voters we had just been expected to take the word of Diebold and other voting machine manufacturers that their proprietary software and hardware was secure. In the case of Diebold it came from and ATM manufacturer after all.

I also plan to buy Avi Rubin's new book "Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting" to see what what other new security problems they have found. The change to electronic voting machines has been pushed as a solution to the "hanging chads" [wikipedia.org] problem that Florida had in the 2000 presidential election between G.W. Bush and Al Gore [wikipedia.org]. Unfortunately, electronic voting machines are creating more security problems than they are solving. If we do use voting machines, then we should at least requre that they all generate a paper stub which which the voter gets to briefly view before it is deposited into a box. Only some of the voting machines currently in use do that. That way, election officials could still do a "real" recount.

Academics vs. Engineers

I have worked on some rather large and complex systems. And I'm fairly certain if you turned some academics loose on said systems, they would find "critical flaws" that they would tout to anyone who would listen.

The thing is ... the systems I've worked on actually work. The "critical flaws" that I'm sure could be found don't actually break the system.

And so far it appears to be the same with the Diebold systems. All these Academics and Slashdotters are outraged about a system that, so far, hasn't failed in the way they predicted.

The fact of the matter is that grant-to-grant academics don't understand engineering, because they've never really had to engineer anything.

Oh, and, just something to savor : if it weren't for all the politicization that has resulted from this business (to which Slashdot contributed a not insignifcant part) some competent gov't contractor might have gotten in the business and blown Diebold out of the water. Of course, now they wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot contracting pole. Enjoy Diebold!

Re:Voter Fraud, it doesn't require Debold!

SLASHDOT IS FOR TOOLS AND FOOLS!

You forgot Ghouls, Mules, and Pools.

Re:Silent Spring

Yes, let's trust the politician's opinion over the scientist's.

Here is what Rachel Carson actually said in her book:

It is more sensible in some cases to take a small amount of damage in preference to having none for a time but paying for it in the long run by losing the very means of fighting [is the advice given in Holland by Dr Briejer in his capacity as director of the Plant Protection Service]. Practical advice should be "Spray as little as you possibly can" rather than "Spray to the limit of your capacity."

Let's look at the Wikipedia article on DDT: [wikipedia.org]

In some areas DDT has lost much of its effectiveness, especially in areas such as India where outdoor transmission is the predominant form. According to one article by V.P. Sharma, "The declining effectiveness of DDT is a result of several factors which frequently operate in tandem. The first and the most important factor is vector resistance to DDT. All populations of the main vector, An. culicifacies have become resistant to DDT." In India, with its outdoor sleeping habits and frequent night duties, "the excito-repellent effect of DDT, often reported useful in other countries, actually promotes outdoor transmission."

According to a pesticide industry newsletter, DDT is obsolete for malarial prevention in India not only owing to concerns over its toxicity, but because it has largely lost its effectiveness.

So the politician you quoted was completely wrong on several different levels. In her book, Rachel Carson argues for limiting the use of DDT since excessive use can harm people and also make it less effective in fighting malaria.

It turns out that even the pesticide industry agrees with her.

Re:Voter Fraud, it doesn't require Debold!

Yes, election fraud is a real concern. The big, big problem with e-voting is that it makes it much easier to do on a large scale basis. Some dumb NASCAR mom from South Carolina who has worked a lot of elections can likely detect a voting booth that has been tampered with. But do you think she can detect the that the e-voting machine does not have the latest mircosoft patches? Or the C code is full of bugs?

Mod parent insightful

It's a bit off-topic since it talks about what happens BEFORE you mark your ballot, but still very insightful.

Voter intimidation and gerrymandering have been with us since the beginning of the Republic. Voter intimidation, at least on a small or individual scale, will probably never end. I do have some hope for the end of politically-motivated district lines, but only if the people rise up and demand it.

What we can do is get rid of large-scale barriers to voting, such as inadequate polling places, registration and registration-challenge rules that can be and are used to manipulate elections, and other barriers. I say if you bring the same documents you need to fill out the "I am a citizen" part of an I-9 form plus recent proof of address to the polls then you are good to vote. Homeless and college students need only prove they have an address of record where they vote. After-the-fact checks can spot people who vote twice using different addresses. The real threat of jail should be enough to deter such acts.