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PCI Compliance

Posted by samzenpus on Mon Aug 27, 2007 01:32 PM
from the read-all-about-it dept.
Ben Rothke writes "It has long been rumored that manufacturers of items such as razors and batteries specifically produce their products to an inferior level in order to ensure repeat business. A similar paradox is occurring in the information security space where many are complaining that the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is too complex and costly. What is most troubling is that such opinions are being written in periodicals and by people that should know better." Read on for the rest of Ben's review.
PCI Compliance: Understand and Implement Effective PCI Data Security Standard Compliance
author Tony Bradley
pages 352
publisher Syngress
rating 9
reviewer Ben Rothke
ISBN 1597491659
summary Great for anyone who has PCI responsibilities or wants to gain a quick understanding of the PCI DSS requirements.


PCI came to life when Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Diner's Club, Discover, and JCB collaborated to create a new set of standards to deal with credit card fraud. PCI requires that all merchants and service providers that handle, transmit, store or process information concerning any of these cards, or related card data, be required to be compliant with the PCI DSS. If they are not compliant, they can face monetary penalties and/or have their card processing privileges terminated by the credit card issuers.

The primary purpose of PCI is to force organizations to embrace common security controls to protect credit card data and reduce fraud and theft. The following are the six primary control areas and 12 specific requirements of the PCI DSS:

Build and maintain a secure network

1. Install and maintain firewall configurations

2. Do not use vendor-supplied or default passwords

Protect cardholder data

3. Protect stored data

4. Encrypt transmissions of cardholder data across public networks

Maintain a vulnerability management program

5. Use and regularly update anti-virus software

6. Develop and maintain secure systems and applications

Implement Strong Access Control Measures

7. Restrict access to need-to-know

8. Assign unique IDs to each person with computer access

9. Restrict physical access to cardholder data

Regularly monitor and test networks

10. Monitor and track all access to network resources and cardholder data

11. Regularly test security systems and processes

Maintain an information security policy

12. Maintain a policy that addresses information security

A quick review of these 12 items shows that PCI is a textbook example of the fundamentals of information security. With that, PCI Compliance: Understand and Implement Effective PCI Data Security Standard Compliance is an excellent resource that provides the reader with all of the fundamental information needed to understand and implement PCI DSS.

The books 13 chapters provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of all of the details and requirements of PCI. The first three chapters provide an overview of the basics about PCI and the basic requirements of the standard. The following six chapters go into detail about each of the primary control areas.

In particular, chapter 6 provides a good overview of the PCI logging requirements. This requirement can be time-consuming to put into place. The author notes that a commonly overlooked but essential requirement, namely that of accurate and synchronized time on network devices. Enterprise information network and security infrastructure devices are highly dependent on synchronized time and PCI recognizes that correct time is critical for transactions across a network.

In a further discussion about synchronized time in chapter 9, the author unfortunately makes an error when he states that local hardware is considered a stratum 1 time source since it gets its time from its own CMOS. From an NTP perspective, only a device that is directly linked to a stratum-0 device is called a stratum-1. CMOS clocks are notoriously inaccurate and can't be relied upon.

The title of chapter 12 is both amusing and accurate 'Planning to fail your first Audit'. The irony is that so many organizations lack a CISO or formal business security program in place designed to protect corporate information assets. They don't focus on information security as a process, rather as a set of products or regulatory items to be checked-off. Yet, these same organizations are surprised when they fail an audit.

The book concludes in chapter 13 with the well-known observation that security is a process, not an event. The book astutely notes that it is impossible to be PCI compliant without approaching security as a process. Trying to achieve compliance without integrating the various aspects in an integrated fashion is bound to fail.

Overall, PCI Compliance: Understand and Implement Effective PCI Data Security Standard Compliance is a great book for one of the most sensible security standards ever. Anyone who has PCI responsibilities or wants to gain a quick understanding of the PCI DSS requirements will find the book to be quite valuable.

Ben Rothke is a security consultant with BT INS and the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know


You can purchase PCI Compliance: Understand and Implement Effective PCI Data Security Standard Compliance from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
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  • Useful book (Score:2)

    by 2.7182 (819680) on Monday August 27, @01:36PM (#20374555)
    But there are a number of typos in the glossary.
  • "PCI" or "PCI" ? (Score:2, Informative)

    by bradgoodman (964302) on Monday August 27, @01:37PM (#20374571)
    (http://www.bradgoodman.com/)
    I don't think this is talking about the "PCI" that most of us know and love... :-O TMA!
  • by adamwright (536224) on Monday August 27, @01:47PM (#20374677)
    (http://www.archgrove.co.uk/)
    It's "Payment Card Industry" (maybe in the USA this is a common term, but I've never heard it in the UK, to my knowledge). From the summary, I thought it was some kind of PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus level security (i.e. encrypted electrical transport), for DRM!
  • Costly... (Score:4, Interesting)

    by BobMcD (601576) on Monday August 27, @01:48PM (#20374695)

    Regularly monitor and test networks

    10. Monitor and track all access to network resources and cardholder data

    11. Regularly test security systems and processes
    These two stand out as the most costly. Are they things you SHOULD do? Yes. Can you reasonably mark either of these as 100% compliant at any time? Maybe, but this isn't going to be pretty, or cheap...

    Lets look at #10 first. What does "all access to network resources" define out to be? These days EVERYTHING is a network resource, and not all of them are within the admin's control. Take the iPhone for example. Is the PCI-compliant admin supposed to certify that every iPhone on the company's network cannot be accessed by others, thereby turning it into a 'network resource'? How do I, as an admin, track that Joe and Jim transfered files peer-to-peer style between their phones? I assume that we have to then ban all these devices?

    It is _possible_ to comply with 'all access to network resources', but this is costly.

    Cardholder data, on the other hand, can be limited and is perfectly reasonable as a requirement.

    For #11, does 'regular' imply frequent as well? Does that compound with 'all network resources'? If so, this is a HUGE time sink. It could also be done, but this has a cost attached as well.
  • by ErichTheRed (39327) on Monday August 27, @01:52PM (#20374735)
    ...PCI is an excuse to hire the KPMGs, Accentures and EDSs of the world. They will charge you $xM for "experts" to put in controls and make your systems secure. All the while, only a few percent of your card transactions are fraudulent. The thing about PCI is that you can't just take the hit for fraud anymore...you get smacked with huge fines for every leaked credit card number, etc.

    I'm not a big believer in the whole "identity theft" hype -- if someone steals your credit card numbers or social security number, just get copies of your credit reports, make the appropriate phone calls, and the problem goes away.

    From what I've seen, PCI's just a consultant-employment excuse. Anyone can still write down credit card numbers and sell them. Maybe forcing the card industry into adopting a secure payment system in the first place would be a better way to go. Overall though, having no standards is bad too, so that's definitely what PCI is good for.
    • Re:Just like HIPAA or Sarbanes-Oxley... by cyphercell (Score:2) Monday August 27, @01:57PM
    • by ScentCone (795499) on Monday August 27, @01:59PM (#20374819)
      if someone steals your credit card numbers or social security number, just get copies of your credit reports, make the appropriate phone calls, and the problem goes away

      Never had it happen to anyone you know, huh? The problem doesn't just "go away" if your checking account is cleaned out right when you need to make a mortgage payment. It doesn't just "go away" if this happens to you during your job application cycle, especially to a secure or trusted position. It can take months or years to clean up after something like this, and you have to watch it like a hawk pretty much for the rest of your life.
      [ Parent ]
      • by gEvil (beta) (945888) on Monday August 27, @02:15PM (#20374997)
        (http://evil.google.com/)
        Exactly right. It can take years to clean up. And if your stolen information is used on the other side of the country, you need to file police reports with the appropriate authorities in that other city/county/state. And guess what, they'll probably want you to come into their offices in person to do it. And if you don't have a copy of the appropriate police reports, the big three reporting agencies won't even want to hear from you, cos you're obviously just wasting their time (remember, you are not their customer--the credit companies are). Yeah, it's no problem to get crap like this removed from your record. I'm usually not the type of person to say this sort of thing, but I really hope ErichTheRed has his identity stolen some time so he can see just how "simple" the whole process is...
        [ Parent ]
    • Re:Just like HIPAA or Sarbanes-Oxley... by johnharrisyankee (Score:1) Monday August 27, @02:24PM
    • Re:Just like HIPAA or Sarbanes-Oxley... by blahplusplus (Score:2) Monday August 27, @07:57PM
  • Maybe they do know. (Score:3, Interesting)

    by Spazmania (174582) on Monday August 27, @01:54PM (#20374751)
    (http://bill.herrin.us/)
    For those who didn't catch the acronym, PCI = payment card industry, i.e. Visa, Mastercard et al.

    many are complaining that the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is too complex and costly. What is most troubling is that such opinions are being written in periodicals and by people that should know better.

    Maybe the opinions got it right. I lead the systems administration team for an organization which does a tremendous number of credit card transactions. PCI DSS compliance is a joke. You answer a long questionaire, much of which has no relevance (virus scanner for your Linux web server!?). Next you submit to a black-box scan of your exterior network interface by an external auditor who does nothing more than run Nessus against your address space. Then they hassle you about all the faulty Nessus hits. Yes we are running SSL IMAP and no it doesn't have any known security vulnerabilities despite the rank 7 nessus hit documented by a URL that returns a 404 error. Commence eyeroll.
  • Sauce for the goose... (Score:4, Insightful)

    by UncleTogie (1004853) * on Monday August 27, @01:57PM (#20374783)
    (http://127.0.0.1/ | Last Journal: Friday November 02, @08:43PM)

    I'm going to have to call foul here. Working with point-of-sale systems, we deal with PCI compliance in software regularly, so I've tried to keep up with the PCI regs as it pertains to the software packages we sell.

    It's a blatant double-standard. They want to lock down EVERYTHING downstream from them, with accountability, yet even after numerous break-ins, apparently have not applied the same standards to *themselves*.

    On the flip side, most of our customers couldn't give a rat's kazoo about compliance, and would do without it 'cause of various inconveniences... {You can only transfer CC-orders twice per order, per spec...} We get buy-in by explaining the penalties if they're caught, and let 'em know that while it may be IMPROBABLE, it's quite possible.
  • by tehSpork (1000190) on Monday August 27, @02:04PM (#20374861)
    I do server admin and light coding work for a small company that has a primarily web-based business. Going through ScanAlert not only do we have a nice logo to put on the website but we also get a list of stuff that could cause problems such as XSS and software package vulnerabilities (and can check to see if problems are fixed after we've patched the problem).

    The thing is, obtaining PCI certification is not that hard. Any decent web admin should already be halfway there, the rest is just locking down applications and making sure you keep on top of the software installed on your server(s).

    While their port requirement is somewhat absurd for anyone trying to run everything (web, email, dns) on one box (no more than 10 open ports, tcp and udp are counted separately) it is a pretty nice service and makes my employer more comfortable with their business, if the credit card companies get a kick out of it then all the better. :)
  • balance (Score:1)

    by WwWonka (545303) on Monday August 27, @02:26PM (#20375123)
    Having worked for a multi-billion dollar mutual fund company as the head of network security I saw first hand the many paradoxes of standards vs reality, as I am sure we all have in the security field.

    1. Receive "quality" industry wide standard and procedures that are meant to protect and secure.
    2. Huddle around a conference table and try and dissect what this means for the company.
    3. Try and find the cheapest and best "close to scenario" for complying with the standards.
    4. Implement and cheer that "WE HAVE COMPLIED!"
    5. secretly mumble and complain under our breath that this is f$#ked and no where near as secure as it should be.

    Watching a company, such as the one I worked with budget out and just squeak by in complying with ad-hoc measures and procedures left a huge distaste in my mouth for data security in corporate America.
  • PCI isn't that bad to implement (Score:2, Informative)

    I led an effort at a Fortune 100 company to bring their online storefront and it's backing systems into compliance with the PCI Standard. We started with doing a gap analysis, implementing the changes and improvements, doing an internal audit, and then an external audit for Visa.

    The requirement language is sometimes a little vague but by using your best judgement and putting your security and customer hats on, it isn't too hard to figure out.

    I actually found the requirements a great tool to convince upper management that they need to invest the time and money into really cleaning up the security of the site and backing systems. Most of the gaps were things that should have been fixed, but always fell behind the latest marketing push project for budget and resources. The threat of large fines made it possible to do a thorough analysis and overhaul, resulting in a much more secure system.

    Most of it is really common sense:
    • Limit and log access to your production systems that deal with credit card information
    • Encrypt PII and credit card data, in storage and transit
    • Don't keep your encryption keys in CVS with anonymous access turned on, etc...
    • Use firewalls and keep your machines and networks secure
    • Make sure your world facing applications don't have nasty SQL or XSS injection vulnerabilities
    • Log financial action related stuff, and keep the logs around in a reasonably safe from tampering fashion


    I think that while the actual wording and guidelines could have been handled better it provides a pretty good start at a baseline of security, and is a good tool to force companies to really address security, instead of always focusing on maximizing profits all the time.
  • As I recall from a class a long time ago, all of those n-bladed hexi-flexi razors are built to very high technology standards. It was apparently a $1B and bet your company kind of investment by Gillette to initiate these sorts of razors and create the machines that could do the sort of precise welding needed.

    The razors themselves are high tech and excellent quality -- they don't want you to cut yourself which would be bad for repeat business.

    What is kept very secret is how the manufacturer thinks they should last. To create repeat business, they won't tell you to replace the blade daily, weekly, or monthly. They'll let you decide.
  • by jaydestr0 (1148327) on Monday August 27, @04:29PM (#20376573)
    as a sysadmin for a managed hosting company the PCI compliance issues we run into are 99.9% of the time not even real legit issues that would be of a major risk to a credit card processing website. most of them are simply flag checks of versions of software that are installed. most of the time, say on a RHEL system the actual version numbers remain old and the required patches are backported into the rpm. almost any time i get the "OMG I AM SO OUT OF DATE" request from a client it means i simply have to paste the rpm information and sending a link to the errata. "you are fine, you are not going to be hax0r3d, your biz is not completely dead." companies that provide "free security scans" for your average web server colo normally just send total bullshit that just get people in a frenzy for no reason.
  • by slapphappe (694246) on Monday August 27, @09:00PM (#20379373)
    PCI compliance is (a) a sensible set of rules to better protect the privacy and security of credit card transactions but, more importantly, it is (b) a new mechanism for banks to levy astronomical fees against non-compliant merchants and (c) build a self-serving governance consulting industry which will promote the rather profitable idea that banks are outside of the loop when bad things happen in the payment card industry.
    First off, banks are parasitic business -- they do not typically kill the host. While they may threaten to cut merchants off, they are more about generating fees and mitigating risk. The threat of being cut off is simply to make the huge non-compliance fines seem like the more palatible alternative.
    Next is: Since when is a bank blameless when somebody impersonates us and takes money out of our account? They've invented the "identity theft" thing to explain that what was stolen was our identity, not the money we entrust them with -- and which they disbursed to a third party without our proper authority. So we have to fix the fraud which was actually perpetrated against the bank by that third party, even though we were in now way involved in the fraudulent transaction. We should insist on calling this a monetary theft, to restore the notion of bank robbery, which it really is. PCI compliance will further insulate banks from their responsibilities to account holders. All risk will, by additional agreements, be transferred to either the merchant and the cardholder when things go wrong. Nice business when you can get it, even if it takes a bit of PCI collusion to set it up!
  • Management problem (Score:2)

    by threaded (89367) on Tuesday August 28, @12:51AM (#20380835)
    (http://www.threaded.com/index.html)
    PCI is NOT a problem for techies, it is a problem for managers. Several places I've worked there has been intense pressure to circumvent PCI because it all appears as 'non-functional' requirements on their charts.

    I've even seen one place recycling client data as test data: those customers were seriously peeved about the odd charges and paybacks on their bills. Which was why I was brought in. Try explaining to a management team that a bug isn't in the code but in their technique.
  • by cyphercell (843398) on Monday August 27, @01:44PM (#20374637)
    (http://127.0.0.1/ | Last Journal: Thursday September 20, @12:52PM)
    No, it is not
    [ Parent ]
  • by johnharrisyankee (1148195) on Monday August 27, @02:11PM (#20374943)
    You missed the point, this has nothing to do with mil spec.
    It is about poorly made products. I know Gillette can make a razor that lasts much longer, but then again, I would buy less, and they would make less.
    And talk about Duracell batteries, of course they could last much much much longer, but then again, people would buy less of them.
    [ Parent ]
  • Re:!bus (Score:1)

    by EvanED (569694) <evanedNO@SPAMgmail.com> on Monday August 27, @02:16PM (#20375015)
    It's not a truck either. You can't just dump stuff on it.
    [ Parent ]
  • by johnharrisyankee (1148195) on Monday August 27, @02:19PM (#20375043)
    If PCI is too complex, then security is too complex.
    And if security is too complex for them.... take away their business license.
    If you can't comply with PCI, then as a vendor are not grown up enough to accept credit cards.

    [ Parent ]
  • by GuyverDH (232921) on Monday August 27, @02:34PM (#20375225)
    I for one am glad that we don't have military grade batteries.

    I used them during my stint in the military, they sucked.
    We always bought bulk (Pick your favorite brand-name here) to take into the field with us.
    [ Parent ]
  • I am not qualified to do an external audit but I do provide assistance to smaller businesses which need to do internal reviews, help understand what is required, etc.

    The PCI-DSS 1.1 is actually relatively flexible. It is possible to show that valid business needs preclude certain requirements (such as video surveillance of server rooms) and that any possible threats are being dealt with in other ways. See the appendix on compensating controls.

    Assuming you have somewhat competent help on security, about 80% of the work is in the area of documentation. You can't just be compliant, you have to document your policies, show that they are in fact compliant, and so forth.

    Honestly, I help small convenience stores to PCI-DSS security evaluations (as the equivalent of an internal audit-- my goal is to help them reach complaince, not to provide independant varification of such compliance). It is a pain, but not impractical. Most of the requirements are basic industry-standard best practices. Anything that is too overwhelming for the little guy can be dealt with in compensating controls.

    The key rules to minimize issues are:

    1) Store only what you need. The less you store, the fewer areas of concern you have.
    2) Build and maintain secure systems.
    3) Establish and defend appropriate security perimeters.
    4) Document, document, document.

    This isn;t rocket science. And quite frankly, 1-3 ought to apply to everyone anyway...
    [ Parent ]
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