Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations 114
brothke writes "In aviation today, technically advanced airplanes present a unique paradox. Technically advanced airplanes, in theory, have more available safety, and the outcome should be that there are fewer accidents. But without proper training for their pilots, they could be less safe than airplanes with less available safety. The FAA found that without proper training for the pilots who fly them, technically advanced airplanes don't advance safety at all. The reason is that technically advanced airplanes present challenges that under-prepared pilots might not be equipped to handle." Read on for the rest of the review.
In the IT world, staff members are often expected to install, configure, maintain and support technically advanced software. Companies often buy huge infrastructure software, such as CRM, ERP, PKI, identify management, intrusion detection and more, without first understanding how to make them work in their complex environment. Management often is oblivious to the fact that just because they can buy and install the software that it will not work on its own. The reason why so many large software deployments fail miserably is that the IT staff often doesn't have the proper training, support and assistance that they need.Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations | |
author | Neville Stanton, Paul Salmon, Daniel Jenkins, Guy Walker |
pages | 446 |
publisher | CRC Press |
rating | 10/10 |
reviewer | Ben Rothke |
ISBN | 978-1439809914 |
summary | Invaluable reference that can be used for the design, assessment, evaluation an operations of NOCs and SOCs |
Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations is a fantastic book that shows what it takes to ensure support staff work and operate together, in a formal and efficient manner. The book integrates the topics of human factors and ergonomics to create an incredibly valuable tome. The book details the interactions between people and their working environment, and shows in depth how the work environment can and must be designed to reduce errors, improve performance, improve the quality of work, and increase the work satisfaction of the workers themselves.
While the book was written primarily for control room settings, it is relevant for those in IT if they have any involvement in remote support, security operation centers (SOC) and network operation centers (NOC).
While the book is of value to anyone involved in operation, those who will find the most value are those charged with the management and operations or large groups or operations. If they have management support to deploy the formal methods detailed in the book, they will find that they can create significantly higher levels of customer and end-user satisfaction.
The authors note that all SOC and NOC's have a common feature in that the people operating them are often remote from the processes that they are monitoring and controlling, and the operations function on a 24/7 basis. The many demands of remote and continuous operation place special considerations on the design of the SOC and NOC. The output of the book is that it can be used to effectively to design these operating centers.
The books presents a comprehensive and all-inclusive on the topic of human factors on the following 14 topics: competencies, training, procedures, communications, workload, automation, supervision, shift patterns, control room layout, SCADA interfaces, alarms, control room environment, human error, and safety culture. Each chapter includes extensive diagrams and flowcharts to show how the processes develop.
The book also provides a highly analytical approach to each topic. It details the required processes and procedures necessary to make each subject area work. The book is not only based on the four author's expertise; they quote heavily from other experts and their research.
Chapter 2 opens with the observation that the safe and efficient operation of operating centers and control rooms is dependent upon the competence of the operators working within them. It details how to create competence assessments to ensure that staff is capable of carrying out their tasks safely and efficiently by assessing their skills and knowledge. The authors stress that it is not acceptable for organizations to assume that their staff are competent based on only their exposure to training and experience. They suggest that organizations create a program to determine those competence levels.
Chapter 3 goes into detail about how to create effective training programs to ensure worker competence. The benefit of a trained worked is that they can yield higher productivity and provide better service. Well-trained workers often have better morale and produce less errors. The chapter details the importance of a training needs analysis to properly determine what needs to be in the curriculum.
Chapter 4 is on procedures and is particularly important to those working in a SOC or NOC. If consistent and repeatable procedures are created, staff can provide much a more effective and dependable levels of service. Even with the benefits of well crafted procedures, its development process is a complex one involving the identification of all of the tasks that require procedures, a judgment on the level of assistance required, identification of the type or format of procedure required, writing and reviewing the procedures, and obtaining approval for them.
The importance of procedures is underscored when the book notes research that 70% of accidents and incidents within the nuclear power companies occurred when workers failed to properly follow procedures. In the petrochemical industry, 27% of incidents were caused by situations for which there were inadequate or no procedures available.
The percentage of failed IT projects and large software rollout catastrophes is both staggering and appalling. No other sector but IT would tolerate such failures. A book like as Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations goes a long way to stop that. The book is a rare one in that it both provides all of the factors involved in the problem at hand, and then provides all of the details needed to obviate those problems.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Human Factors in the Design and Evaluation of Central Control Room Operations from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Wow (Score:2, Insightful)
I'm not reading the review. If it's half as painful to read as the summary was, I think I'll save myself the agony.
Seriously, redundant much?
Technically Advanced probably means.... (Score:1, Insightful)
Maybe this explains Toyota's problems (Score:2, Insightful)
This could explain some of the Toyota crashes. The drivers don't understand what they need to do to slow down and stop the car when the accelerator acts like it's stuck.
Anecdote (Score:2, Insightful)
My one and only car crash, due to my fault, is due to ABS. It was my first ABS car and I tried to pump the brake, and failed to stop before hitting the other car.
It was a minor fender bender, never mind any injury, but it burned it into my skull: slam the brake.
Fridge? (Score:5, Insightful)
The authors note that all SOC and NOC's have a common feature in that the people operating them are often remote from the processes that they are monitoring and controlling, and the operations function on a 24/7 basis. The many demands of remote and continuous operation place special considerations on the design of the SOC and NOC. The output of the book is that it can be used to effectively to design these operating centers.
You need a big fridge, and a microwave.
Another common feature is at least of all NOCs I've seen is marketing wants the most stylish looking facility they can get, which is often/always completely at odds with the goals of an effective facility.
Common noc mistakes:
1) Everyone crammed in like sardines so "we can work together". Except that no one noticed that we don't work together. All it makes is a lot of noise and interference. No space to open a stack of manuals, closely related to no space for usable computer monitors (as opposed to the ones used only for show). Even worse, designers seem addicted to adding "static noise" masking generator, crappy elevator music, and/or a PA system for other departments blaring away. Thru careful work, its possible to include features to make it look like its ideal for cooperation, yet make actual cooperation impossible due to noise level etc.
2) Extraordinarily expensive big screen TVs / monitors / projectors on all the forward facing walls, that no one actually uses. Too small, too low res, no actual business purpose. This is a killer two ways, first of all its a huge capital expense that could have paid the salary for extra techs for years, which would have a measurable positive effect. The other way its a killer is you'll actually take people off productive work to "fix" the big screens so marketing is happy. Would anyone in the NOC have a problem doing their job if all the projector bulbs burned out? No, but marketing would freak out.
3) Second class citizen status. "Real" employees can have family pictures in their work area. The dogs of the "noc", not so much. This attitude flows thru the organization in many other ways, producing discontent. Promotion out of the noc becomes a goal, not to "advance" but just to get the hell out.
4) Constant over the shoulder monitoring. No matter if its marketing, or management, there seems an utterly desperate desire to perch over the NOC workers shoulders, either physically or virtually. A great employer-employee attitude if you are 17 years old and working at taco bell. Not a great attitude in a professional noc environment. There seems something inherent in all NOC management that makes them distrust their employees, that you generally don't see in most other departments. Kind of like having the ability to treat them as serfs inevitably makes it a requirement to treat them like serfs.
5) You know those 1970's "sunken livingrooms"? alive and well in the nocs of the world. How about the 1960s original star trek theatre in the round concept with a bridge in the middle? alive and well in the nocs of the world. Remember the set of "wargames" from 1983? Why can't a noc be designed that doesn't look like a throwback or parody? At least try something different, like a medieval dungeon or something?
A distant relative Mercedes (Score:1, Insightful)
A distant relative by marriage bought a top of line new Mercedes. He has to attend a Saturday long training class for four Saturdays.
After laughing in disbelief. I asked why does he need a training class. In a nutshell, apparently there's so much electronic bullshit (I guess to justify the price of the car somehow) that they need classes. GPSes, internet and whatnot
I started thinking about all that distraction for the driver. I can just see liability insurance eventually going through the roof - while the old rich guy is fucking around with his car, he goes and rear ends someone or runs over a pedestrian.
There's a point where all this complexity becomes counter productive and makes the car more unsafe.
Back in my day... (Score:5, Insightful)
My late Grandfather used to tell me stories all the time of stuff that happened in the air traffic control tower at Charlotte-Douglas airport (he was the chief of the tower for 20 years). 99% of the time, human error is to blame, for stuff like military pilots trying to land at the wrong airport and not listening to comms to stuff like poor pronounciation over comms to pilots causing close calls. By the end of his career, he found that work ethic was more important than credentials, because laziness was the cause of a large majority of mishaps. It is difficult to train work ethic, and easy to impart knowledge.
Rewarding diligence and establishing a culture of consistency was their solution. I've seen it work in other industries over the years as well. But, when you think about it, isn't it just common sense to do it? Why do you need a book to explain that?
Re:I'm not surprised, sadly... (Score:3, Insightful)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_mapping [wikipedia.org]
On a more interesting note, with respect to the people having issues with the Toyotas accelerating to ludicrous speed, why oh why did they not consider slamming the breaks? Maybe pop the thing into neutral? Sure, engine damage, but at least no crash.
Re:Yes. Here's a bad example. (Score:1, Insightful)
If it isn't obscenely expensive, incredibly wasteful and even more incredibly useless, it wasn't designed by a Russian.
Face it, you think the US is bad about being showy, but Russia takes the cake in large, showy, unnecessary things.
Re:Yes. Here's a bad example. (Score:3, Insightful)
I'll bet that, within a year or two, the people who actually have to run the grid set up a "field control center" with about twenty people with PCs, cork boards on the walls, 2-way radios for talking to field crews, a conference/map table, and some printers. The real work will be done there. A few people will sit in the big room and answer questions for management.
At a previous employer, for a Very Important Photoshoot for marketing, they hired college age models to staff our center in the pictures, apparently because the real personnel were far too unphotogenic. I believe the age of all the models added together still didn't reach the age of some of our old timers.
Kind of like how anytime you see a call center in marketing material, its always staffed by stereotypical beauty pageant white women, where in reality most (not all) call centers have been moved to prisons and 3rd world countries. I've often wondered what the prisoners and 3rd worlders think when they see those advertisements (other than the obvious, americans are idiots, etc)
Re:Maybe this explains Toyota's problems (Score:3, Insightful)
I found it quite funny that all through the Olympics we were dunned with ads from Lexus claiming that their "interface" (the start button) is simple, intuitive, and easy because they designed it so you just do what you always do.
I can't think of ANYONE whose first impulse when they urgently want a button to work is to press and hold it for at least 3 seconds. Just look at impatient people at the elevator. It's never press and hold, it's always press press press press PRESS. It doesn't matter if it's already lit or not. If they REALLY designed the car so you just do what you always do, it would respond to rapid fire presses. When your car is running away on the highway (or you believe it is), even one second seems like an eternity.