The Logical Leap: Induction In Physics 630
FrederickSeiler writes "When David Harriman, this book's author, was studying physics at Berkeley, he
noticed an interesting contrast: 'In my physics lab course, I learned how to determine the
atomic structure of crystals by means of x-ray diffraction and how to identify
subatomic particles by analyzing bubble-chamber photographs. In
my philosophy of science course, on the other hand, I was taught by a
world-renowned professor (Paul Feyerabend)
that there is no such thing as scientific method and that physicists have no
better claim to knowledge than voodoo priests.
I knew little about epistemology [the philosophy of
knowledge] at the time, but I could not help noticing that it was the
physicists, not the voodoo priests, who had made possible the life-promoting
technology we enjoy today.' Harriman noticed the enormous gulf between science as it is successfully
practiced and science as is it described by post-Kantian philosophers such as Feyerabend,
who are totally unable to explain the spectacular achievements of modern
science." Read on for the rest of Frederick's review.
Logical Leap: Induction in Physics
attempts to bridge this gap between philosophy
and science by providing a philosophical explanation of how scientists actually
discover things. A physicist and physics teacher by trade, he worked with
philosopher Leonard Peikoff to understand the process
of induction in physics, and this book is a result of their collaboration.
| The Logical Leap: Induction In Physics | |
| author | David Harriman |
| pages | 272 |
| publisher | NAL Trade |
| rating | 9/10 |
| reviewer | Frederick Seiler |
| ISBN | 0451230051 |
| summary | Explains how scientists discover the laws of nature |
Induction is one of the two types of logical argument; the other type is deduction. First described by Aristotle, deduction covers arguments like the following: (1) All men are mortal. (2) Socrates is a man. (3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal. Deductive arguments start with generalizations ("All men are mortal.") and apply them to specific instances ("Socrates"). Deductive logic is well understood, but it relies on the truth of the generalizations in order to yield true conclusions.
So how do we make the correct generalizations? This is the subject of the other branch of logic induction and it is obviously much more difficult than deduction. How can we ever be justified in reasoning from a limited number of observations to a sweeping statement that refers to an unlimited number of objects? In answering this question Harriman presents an original theory of induction, and he shows how it is supported by key developments in the history of physics.
The first chapter presents the philosophical foundations of the theory, which builds directly on the theory of concepts developed by Ayn Rand. Unfortunately for the general reader, Harriman assumes familiarity with Rand's theory of knowledge, including her views of concepts as open-ended, knowledge as hierarchical, certainty as contextual, perceptions as self-evident, and arbitrary ideas as invalid. Those unfamiliar with these ideas may find this section to be confusing. But the good news is that those readers can then proceed to the following chapters, which flesh out the theory and show how it applies to key developments in the history of physics (and the related fields of astronomy and chemistry). These chapters do a wonderful job at bringing together the physics and the philosophy, clarifying both in the process.
Harriman argues that as concepts form a hierarchy, generalizations form a hierarchy as well; more abstract generalizations rest on simpler, more direct ones, relying ultimately on a rock-solid base of "first-level" generalizations which are directly, perceptually obvious, such as the toddler's grasp of the fact that "pushed balls roll." First-level generalizations are formed from our direct experiences, in which the open-ended nature of concepts leads to generalizations. Higher-level generalizations are formed based on lower-level ones, using Mill's Methods of Agreement and Difference to identify causal connections, while taking into account the entirety of one's context of knowledge.
Ayn Rand held that because of the hierarchical nature of our knowledge, it is possible to take any valid idea (no matter how advanced), and identify its hierarchical roots, i.e. the more primitive, lower-level ideas on which it rests, tracing these ideas all the way back to directly observable phenomena. Rand used the word "reduction" to refer to this process. In a particularly interesting discussion, Harriman shows how the process of reduction can be applied to the idea that "light travels in straight lines," identifying such earlier ideas as the concept "shadow" and finally the first-level generalization "walls resist hammering hands."
Harriman's discussion of the experimental method starts with a description of Galileo's experiments with pendulums. Galileo initially noticed that the period of a pendulum's swing seems to be the same for different swing amplitudes, so he decided to accurately measure this time period to see if it is really true. Concluding that the period is indeed constant, he then did further experiments. He selectively varied the weight and material of the pendulum's bob, and the length of the pendulum. This led him to the discovery that a pendulum's length is proportional to the square of its period. Harriman notes the experiments that Galileo did not perform: 'He saw no need to vary every known property of the pendulum and look for a possible effect on the period. For example, he did not systematically vary the color, temperature, or smell of the pendulum bob; he did not investigate whether it made a difference if the pendulum arm is made of cotton twine or silk thread. Based on everyday observation, he had a vast pre-scientific context of knowledge that was sufficient to eliminate such factors as irrelevant. To call such knowledge "pre-scientific" is not to cast doubt on its objectivity; such lower-level generalizations are acquired by the implicit use of the same methods that the scientist uses deliberately and systematically, and they are equally valid.' One powerful tool for avoiding nonproductive speculations in science is Ayn Rand's concept of the arbitrary, and Harriman brilliantly clarifies this idea in the section on Newton's optical experiments. An arbitrary idea is one for which there is no evidence; it is an idea put forth based solely on whim or faith. Rand held that an arbitrary idea cannot be valid even as a possibility; in order to say "it is possible," one needs to have evidence (which can consist of either direct observations or reasoning based on observations).
Newton began his research on colors with a wide range of observations, which led him to his famous and brilliant experiments with prisms. Harriman presents the chain of reasoning and experimentation which led Newton to conclude that white light consists of a mixture of all of the colors, which are separated by refraction.
Isaac Newton said that he "framed no hypotheses," and here he was referring to his rejection of the arbitrary. When Descartes claimed without any evidence that light consists of rotating particles with the speed of rotation determining the color; and when Robert Hooke claimed without any evidence that white light consists of a symmetrical wave pulse, which results in colors when the wave becomes distorted; these ideas were totally arbitrary, and they deserved to be thrown out without further consideration: "Newton understood that to accept an arbitrary idea even as a mere possibility that merits consideration undercuts all of one's knowledge. It is impossible to establish any truth if one regards as valid the procedure of manufacturing contrary 'possibilities' out of thin air." This rejection of the arbitrary may be expressed in a positive form: Scientists should be focused on reality, and only on reality.
After discussing the rise of experimentation in physics, Harriman turns to the Copernican revolution, the astronomical discoveries of Galileo and Kepler, and the grand synthesis of Newton's laws of motion and of universal gravitation. But this reviewer found the most historically interesting chapter to be the one about the atomic theory of matter; this chapter is a cautionary tale about the lack of objective standards for evaluating theories. This story then leads to Harriman proposing a set of specific criteria of proof for scientific theories.
The final, concluding chapter addresses several broader issues, including why mathematics is fundamental to the science of physics, how the science of philosophy is different than physics, and finally, how modern physics has gone down the wrong path due to the lack of a proper theory of induction.
So, with the publication of Logical Leap, has the age-old "problem of induction" now been solved? On this issue, the reader must judge for himself. What is clear to this reviewer is that Harriman has presented an insightful, thought-provoking and powerful new theory about how scientists discover the laws of nature.
You can purchase The Logical Leap: Induction In Physics from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Re:Philosophy... (Score:5, Interesting)
Yeah. I hear ya.
In my philosophy of science course, on the other hand, I was taught by a world-renowned professor (Paul Feyerabend) that there is no such thing as scientific method and that physicists have no better claim to knowledge than voodoo priests
I'd say he's a bit of a silly goose who needs to study the things he is dismantling before making claims against them. While inductive reasoning leaves itself open to be false, and there are times where inductive reasoning has proven to be false, it does not discredit the scientific method anywhere near enough to put it in the same ballpark as religious beliefs.
Like this review and this book no doubt mentions, science is an open process where anybody and everybody can study and contribute. To find a major flaw in the currently accepted and believed theories is considered a scientific breakthrough, not blasphemy or heathen. Given that those who embrace the scientific method are willing to accept criticism and increase their knowledge of the entire system instead of deny or rebel against it, I believe those people have far more claim to knowledge. If you don't believe what a physicist has come up with, just recreate the scenario yourself and see the results. I challenge any priest, voodoo or otherwise, to do the same without the aid of science or mathematics.
Re:Oh my (Score:5, Interesting)
Really? (Score:2, Interesting)
How about some citations wise one?
Can you earn that "Informative" rating or just make arbitrary statements?
Re:oy (Score:5, Interesting)
If you like something Ayn Rand says, then I guarantee you can find another philosopher said it only in a far more intellectually rigorous manner.
Yeah, mostly Locke, Aristotle and--remarkably given her hostility toward the man and his work--Kant.
People interested in Rand's notion of concepts are well-advised to look at the work of Peter Abelard, too. Although he's famous for other reasons, his conceptualist "third way" between nominalism and idealism is actually viable, and quite close to what Rand was dreaming of.
From the sounds of this book it's nothing but a collection of just-so stories about the history of physics (Hey look, I'm writing a review of a review!) Science is a lot bigger than physics, and physics has a large number of special features that most sciences--biology, geology, astronomy, etc--don't have. As such, it's a lousy place to start when talking about science as such.
The critical piece that's missing from all discussions of induction I'm aware is the creative role of definition. Newton, for example, created definitions of mass, force, etc, such that he could build a consistent, albeit incomplete, mathematical description of phenomena. The concepts he created were not given: they are as much a product of the needs of the knowing subject as they are constrained by the facts. Constrained: not determined.
Unfortunately, philosophers are (still!) innumerate, and as such are not able to grasp the notion of a constraint: they think there must be either just one right way to conceptualize reality (idealism), or that any old way will do (nominalism).
Rand claimed on the one hand to reject these alternatives, but then argued strongly that there was exactly one correct way because "reality really is that way", which is obviously nonsense: even within physics there are frequently several equally correct ways of conceptualizing the same phenomena (Newtonian vs classical physics, for example, which give quite different accounts of the cause of motion, one based on force, one based on the principle of least action or similar.)
Re:Rand (Score:4, Interesting)
you'd think she'd have understood that believing in laissez-faire was, if not arbitrary, then certainly not supported by the evidence. It's certainly true that all the evidence today points to the fact that loosening the brakes on wealth-accumulation is resulting in more pain for the human race overall and less for those who already got theirs.
I think Ayn Rand's problem is as simple as this: she had a bad experience living under Russian Communism, escaped to America, and jumped to the (false) conclusion that since the Bolsheviks' ideology had demonstrably bad effects, then the exact logical opposite of it must have good effects. She retained a harsh Marxist-Stalinist materialist-dialectical view of the world, just flipped the polarity from 'all should serve the State and sacrifice personal advancement' to 'all should serve their selfish interests and sacrifice love and compassion'. She felt that Marxism must be 100% wrong and therefore anti-Marxism would be 100% right. So her view of a healthy human life became so distorted as to literally argue that the best form of love is rape. (That scene is when I stopped reading 'The Fountainhead').
But the opposite of a partial falsehood is not a truth, and Marxism isn't 100% wrong. It isn't wrong to be altruistic, it isn't wrong to be part of a group, it isn't wrong to share one's life with another. Humans are social creatures and our very selfhood allows overlap with others. Egoistic isolation and perpetual competition isn't our natural state - we go crazy in solitary confinement.
What's wrong is to abuse others and ignore their talents, either for personal gain or for group conformity. Reality is about 90 degrees rotated from the left-right axis that Marx and Rand take.