"To date, no known flaws have been found against DES" : Er, differential calculus? Why do you think we created Triple-DES? Because we like things in threes? Supposedly the NSA made it more difficult to use differential calculus against DES by changing the S-Box permutations but it is still possible.
In 1975-76, Diffie and Martin Hellman criticized the NBS proposed Data Encryption Standard, largely because its 56-bit key length was too short to prevent Brute-force attack. An audio recording survives of their review of DES at Stanford in 1976 with Dennis Branstad of NBS and representatives of the National Security Agency.[5] Their concern was well-founded: subsequent history has shown not only that NSA actively intervened with IBM and NBS to shorten the key size, but also that the short key size enabled exactly the kind of massively parallel key crackers that Hellman and Diffie sketched out. When these were ultimately built outside the classified world, they made it clear that DES was insecure and obsolete. In 2012, a $10,000 commercially available machine can recover a DES key in days.
I think everyone outside of the NSA wanted a longer key length than 56-bits.
But the main comment from the book was that the DEA withstood the test of time, aside from hardware catching up to it and making exhaustive key attack quite practical.
Either Ben or Stapleton is missing something (Score:4, Insightful)
There was a time when the NSA had integrity....
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
There was a time when the NSA had integrity....
Good joke.
In 1975-76, Diffie and Martin Hellman criticized the NBS proposed Data Encryption Standard, largely because its 56-bit key length was too short to prevent Brute-force attack. An audio recording survives of their review of DES at Stanford in 1976 with Dennis Branstad of NBS and representatives of the National Security Agency.[5] Their concern was well-founded: subsequent history has shown not only that NSA actively intervened with IBM and NBS to shorten the key size, but also that the short key size enabled exactly the kind of massively parallel key crackers that Hellman and Diffie sketched out. When these were ultimately built outside the classified world, they made it clear that DES was insecure and obsolete. In 2012, a $10,000 commercially available machine can recover a DES key in days.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W... [wikipedia.org]
Yeah, real integrity there...
Re:Either Ben or Stapleton is missing something (Score:2)
I think everyone outside of the NSA wanted a longer key length than 56-bits.
But the main comment from the book was that the DEA withstood the test of time, aside from hardware catching up to it and making exhaustive key attack quite practical.