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Networking Books Media Security Book Reviews

Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain 50

nazarijo (Jose Nazario) writes "When you arrive to work one morning, you find that your coworker's workstation is acting funny. A quick forensic examination reveals it's been compromised and used to scan the network for more vulnerabilities. When did this happen, and where else is this going on in you domain? With a host integrity monitoring solution, you'll be a lot further along at answering those questions than piecing it all together after the fact. And you can accomplish this with two freeware tools, as described in Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain, a new book from Syngress Publishing." Read on for the rest of Nazario's review.
Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain
author Brian Wotring, with Bruce Potter and Rainer Wichmann
pages 450
publisher Syngress
rating 8
reviewer Jose Nazario
ISBN 1597490180
summary Use freeware tools to ensure your site's security is intact


Host integrity monitoring is the process by which system and network administrators validate and enforce the security of their systems. This can be a complex suite of approaches, tools, and methodologies, and it can be as simple as looking at loggin output. In the past, tools like Tripwire were used to check the configurations on hosts. The freeware version of this tool was limited in its manageability, which was available mainly in the commercial version.

Tools like Osiris and Samhain came along to fill the gap and have since evolved into mature projects themselves. Like any existing software tool out there, any new book should be evaluated not only on its own but also in he context of the existing documentation. Both Osiris and Samhain have decent amounts of documentation available already (Samhain seems to have a larger user documentation repository online than the Osiris tool does), and the book contributes to these docs quite well.

Host Integrity Monitoring shows you how to set up these tools and put them into production on Windows, UNIX, and OS X. Wotring's writing is fairly good, and his examples are usually pretty clear. The pace of the material is good, and there's not a whole lot of domain-specific expertise beyond system administration skills required to make use of the book. At times some of the formatting of the text gets in the way, but that's trivial compared to the quality of writing (which is pretty good).

Overall the material in the book is decent. The book opens with an overview of what host integrity monitoring is, why you should use it, and some of the basic premises. Then it goes on to discuss Samhain and Osiris, starting with their basic installation and then on to their advanced usage. They differ enough that each project merits its own pieces of documentation, even though they're similar in spirit. You'll learn how to schedule scans, integrate with other tools like Swatch, and in general administer a site installation.

The author of the book, Brian Wotring, is more familiar with Osiris than he is with Samhain, and it shows. More material (100 pages) is devoted to using Osiris than is given to Samhain (60 pages), which is to be expected. The coverage of both is sufficient, though, and fills the major parts of the book.

There are three major strengths to this book over the existing docs. The first is seeing not just the tools themselves covered but also the threats they cover in place. The second is having the two tools covered side by side, allowing you to see how to accomplish the same task with each. And thirdly, there are two appendices that are true gems of this book. The first covers how to get your Linksys Linux based AP device monitored using the Osiris tool, which isn't a small feat. The second is how to write your own modules for Osiris and Samhain, for which this appears to be the only documentation for Osiris (Samhain's website has a How To on writing modules). Again, these add value to the book over the freely available documentation.

I would have liked to have seen the chapters devoted specifically to Osiris and Samhain, chapters 6 (Osiris) and 7 (Samhain) broken up into two or three chapters covering their installation and use. The length of these chapters can make finding some material difficult at times. I would have also have liked to see the use of the "bold is input, normal text is output" technical book convention. In many examples finding the user input text can be challenging.

Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain is not only about these tools but about how to accomplish host integrity monitoring on the cheap (since the code is freely available). While you can find docs on each project, this book complements those docs nicely and provides a nicely wrapped package about how to get the most out of each tool. If you've been thinking about how to ensure that no one is tampering with your system, these tools, and this book, should definitely make your solutions list.


You can purchase Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
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Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain

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  • "Samhain" (Score:3, Informative)

    by fiannaFailMan ( 702447 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:21PM (#13374258) Journal
    "Samhain" (pronounced "SAOW-an") is "November" in Irish.
    • by fantomas ( 94850 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:27PM (#13374306)
      Samhuinn/ Samhain - Celtic Quarter Day [beltane.org]: "The Samhuinn Festival serves the seasonally opposite role to Beltane. It was the Celtic New Year, although its practice far precedes the Celtic culture. It marked the end of summer and the time to bring herds in from summer pastures to lowland fields and enclosures for protection. With the signs of approaching winter, it is understandable that the festival should have a strong association with death. The trees are bare and the land barren of the earlier vegetation - nature itself seems to be dying.

      Thus it was believed that this was the night of the dead - a time for the spirits of the departed from the previous year to pay one last visit to their relatives before departing for the other-world forever. Also taking advantage of this closeness between the land of the living and the dead were the mischievous and malevolent spirits of the underworld, and measures had to be taken to protect against their pranks. Thus evolved the tradition of modern Hallowe'en to wear masks - originally to disguise oneself against the unwanted attentions of spirits and faeries.

      Another Samhuinn tradition was a market fair held in the nearest trading centre. This was a chance to settle business, to trade livestock and produce of the autumn and to revel with friends for one last time before the winter conditions made travel too difficult. Amongst the entertainments were the Goloshan Plays. The main theme of these ancient narratives was the battle between light and dark, summer and winter. The two characters fight to the death, winter overcoming summer as inevitably as the seasons, but the medicine-man steps in to revive the summer figure, thus ensuring the return of spring and light."
    • I sometimes wonder if OSS wouldn't be taken more seriously if the names were more...grown up. It might be hard to convince your manager that you need to use open source software that tips its hat to the Egyptian Lord of the Dead.

      What's next? Releases of Linux codenamed "Gozer" and "Zuul".
    • I guess Glenn Danzig was a moron after all
    • I'm sorry, I believe that you have been misinformed ;-)
      Samhain [misfitscentral.com] was the band that Glenn Danzig formed after the Misfits broke up.
  • by Nos. ( 179609 ) <andrew@@@thekerrs...ca> on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:23PM (#13374270) Homepage
    I had to look them up:
    Osiris [hostintegrity.com]
    Samhain [sourceforge.net]
  • Honk! (Score:5, Funny)

    by Stanistani ( 808333 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:28PM (#13374307) Homepage Journal
    > When you arrive to work one morning, you find that your coworker's workstation is acting funny.

    Scan results:
    Workstation infected with Circus_Clown_Virus
  • by Rosco P. Coltrane ( 209368 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:30PM (#13374331)
    but don't like the Slashdot whore link: Clickey [barnesandnoble.com]
  • Arms race (Score:5, Insightful)

    by G4from128k ( 686170 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:31PM (#13374338)
    I wonder how long it will take worm/virus/trojan writers to write payloads that attack, disable, or hide from monitoring applications such as these? I suspect that monitoring apps will need to use the same randomized signature tricks that viruses use to avoid easy detection. Perhaps, the ultimate solution is to go back to non-flash ROMs with unbypassable, built-in integrity checking features.
    • Re:Arms race (Score:5, Informative)

      by Just Some Guy ( 3352 ) <kirk+slashdot@strauser.com> on Monday August 22, 2005 @04:11PM (#13374611) Homepage Journal
      On a FreeBSD system, you can set the "immutable flag" on a file. Given a high enough system securelevel, that file will be completely resistant to change (including unsetting that flag). This is extremely handy for locking down file signature databases, kernel files, and other likely targets for stealth modification. So long as that portion of the kernel stands intact, the system can never be completely clandestinely owned.

      While that's clearly a last-line-of-defense sort of thing, it's certainly a welcome feature. I assume that Linux has a similar mechanism, although I haven't personally used it.

      • by G4from128k ( 686170 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @04:59PM (#13374962)
        On a FreeBSD system, you can set the "immutable flag" on a file. Given a high enough system securelevel, that file will be completely resistant to change (including unsetting that flag). This is extremely handy for locking down file signature databases, kernel files, and other likely targets for stealth modification. So long as that portion of the kernel stands intact, the system can never be completely clandestinely owned

        Very interesting. This FAQ [osxfaq.com] suggest that OS X retains BSD's immutable flag. In theory, the only way to change this flag in OS X is to reboot in single-user mode. I wonder if a rootkit could force a reboot into single user mode, change these flags, and reboot back to remotely own an OS X machine? I would assume that unless the rootkit can insert something into the single-user mode start-up sequence, the system immutable flag should be fairly safe. The big downside would be that System Update would cease to work (and probably create a corrupt partial update) if the wrong file were locked in this way (security vs. ease-of-use again!).
        • Mac OS X does indeed retain the BSD user-immutable and system-immutable flags. For example, the command
          sudo chflags schg filename is completely effective on a Mac, requiring either a sudo shutdown +0 command or a reboot into Mac OS 9, where the file can then be unlocked from the Get Info window.

          Similar functionality can be had in Linux with the lcap command--after making a file immutable, simply remove the CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE capability to prevent further modification until the next reboot. For added securi
        • In theory, the only way to change this flag in OS X is to reboot in single-user mode.

          In FreeBSD, the securelevel is set by one of the rc.d scripts that get executed at boot. You could theoretically insert instructions to run before it gets set. Assuming, of course, that the rc.d scripts themselves haven't been made immutable.

          You nailed the main drawback: upgrading a running system becomes pretty much impossible without a reboot.

          The other one I usually encounter deals with running Aide. Basically, I

        • This is an old BSD 4.4 FFS feature, IIRC, and a great one. Solaris has a similar thing too.

          Rebooting and resetting attribs is only possible if the attacker can change one of the programs executed (or utilised) before the runlevel goes out of single user. Consequently if you plan to use this feature serously, you need to examine and protect every file AND DEVICE (/dev/hd* etc) that is read before going into multiuser mode, and their dependants.

          This isn't actually as bad as it seems for an already tight sys
  • by Nuclear Elephant ( 700938 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:33PM (#13374355) Homepage
    When you arrive to work one morning, you find that your coworker's workstation is acting funny.

    It won't take my coke. The cup holder keeps spitting it out. And I am expecting to be arrested any moment, as it keeps telling me I'm doing something illegal.
  • by georgewilliamherbert ( 211790 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:35PM (#13374378)
    It should be noted that Brian Wotring, the book author, is the lead developer and release manager for Osiris. That probably explains why he knows it better than he knows Samhain...
  • by Ice Station Zebra ( 18124 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @03:36PM (#13374382) Homepage Journal
    First thing tomorrow morning, get on co-workers workstation. Obviously his is more fun than mine.
  • by Anonymous Coward
    ...Danzig or the Misfits???

    Don't they deserve equal time?
  • Microsoft - Integrity - won't fit in the same sentence. More like, "Marginally works - ship it! Patch Later!! Capture Market Share!!!".

  • ...but back then it was named aide(1). It is a sequel to tripwire(1) - also an excellent choice - and makes a nice adjunct to security(7) and periodic(8). Highly recommended; a real page-turner.
  • by justforaday ( 560408 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @04:21PM (#13374699)
    Here's some useful links for those not in the know:

    Osiris [progarchives.com]
    Samhain [wikipedia.org]
  • Tripwire? (Score:2, Interesting)

    by Anonymous Coward
    I've been using tripwire + custom scripts for centralized management for years.

    I'm wondering, why hasn't tripwire been improved or forked? It's GPL right?
    • No, tripwire was commercially developed, and though it was licensed for free academic use (including source) commercial users were expected to pay for it for a number of years now.

      I just checked their website and didn't even see the ASR (Academic Source Release) Tripwire version on the website, so it may be gone entirely now. I am sure you can find it out there on the net, but it's not licensed for free commercial usage.

      AIDE was developed to get around that, some years ago.

      For a good reference list:

    • a) written in C++, it is noticeable slower than all the open source replacements written in C (this is from an actual benchmark, not just hearsay)

      b) if you ever had a look at the (GPLed) code of the open source tripwire release, you would know that it's a mess. the codebase is MUCH larger than that of any other file integrity scanner, it is void of any useful comments, and simply stated, it is what coders call 'spagetti code'.

      Nobody wants to improve or fork that thing - it is faster and easier to write

  • by Kernel Kurtz ( 182424 ) on Monday August 22, 2005 @05:39PM (#13375207)
    I've been using Tripwire [sourceforge.net] (and Tripwire Portable [frenchfries.net]) for years. Recently I have started using Samhain in its place and have been quite happy with it.


    Some useful features that it has which Tripwire doesn't is the ability to monitor kernel system call tables for changes (a common attack vector), and to run as a daemon to alert on changes immediately.


    Its definitely worth a look.

  • Looking at logging output in an enterprise environment can be very difficult. To make this really useful you need to aggregate information in a central repository, from all different servers/apps running on many machines. For true heavy duty log analysis you need to resort to tools such as SenSage [sensage.com]'s log storage/analysis tool.

    Any other tool will choke on the volume of information you'll be chugging through in an enterprise environment, unless you pay for a multi-million-dollar Oracle deployment.

    A Linu

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